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Entrants' Reputation And Industry Dynamics

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  • Bernardita Vial
  • Felipe Zurita

Abstract

This article analyzes entry–exit decisions in a market where reputation determines the price that firms may charge, within a rational‐expectation model of competition in a nonatomic market under heterogeneous reputations. The analysis focuses on the class of name‐switching reputational equilibria, in which a firm discards its name if and only if its reputation falls below the entrants' reputation. The main technical result is the existence of a unique steady‐state equilibrium within this class, in which the entrants' reputation is endogenous. The resulting industry dynamics is largely on agreement with the findings in the empirical literature.

Suggested Citation

  • Bernardita Vial & Felipe Zurita, 2017. "Entrants' Reputation And Industry Dynamics," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58(2), pages 529-559, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:58:y:2017:i:2:p:529-559
    DOI: 10.1111/iere.12226
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Alcalde, Pilar & Vial, Bernardita, 2022. "Implicit trade‐offs in replacement rates: Consumer preferences for firms, intermediaries and annuity attributes," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).

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