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Share the Fame or Share the Blame? The Reputational Implications of Partnerships

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  • Luís Almeida Costa
  • Luís Vasconcelos

Abstract

"We use an adverse selection model to study the dynamics of firms' reputations when firms implement joint projects. We show that in the case of joint projects a firm's reputation does not necessarily increase following a success and does not necessarily decrease following a failure. We also study how reputation considerations affect firms' decisions to participate in joint projects. We show that a high-reputation partner is not necessarily preferable to a low-reputation partner and, when implementation of the joint project by a single firm is possible, a high-quality partner may not be preferable to a low-quality partner." Copyright (c) 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc..

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.

Volume (Year): 19 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (06)
Pages: 259-301

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Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:19:y:2010:i:2:p:259-301

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Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/journals/JEMS/

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References

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  1. George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2000. "Who Wants a Good Reputation?," CARESS Working Papres sell-rep, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
  2. Alan D. Morrison & William J. Wilhelm Jr, 2004. "Partnership Firms, Reputation, and Human Capital," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1682-1692, December.
  3. Quinzii, Martine & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1985. "Multidimensional signalling," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 261-284, June.
  4. Jean-Charles Rochet & Philippe Chone, 1998. "Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(4), pages 783-826, July.
  5. Hakenes, Hendrik & Peitz, Martin, 2006. "Observable Reputation Trading," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 131, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  6. Miklos-Thal, Jeanine, 2008. "Linking Reputations: The Signaling and Feedback Effects of Umbrella Branding," MPRA Paper 11045, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Engers, Maxim, 1987. "Signalling with Many Signals," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(3), pages 663-74, May.
  8. Johannes H�rner, 2002. "Reputation and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(3), pages 644-663, June.
  9. Steven Tadelis, 2002. "The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(4), pages 854-882, August.
  10. Axel Anderson & Lones Smith, 2006. "Assortative Matching and Reputation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1553, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  11. Steve Tadelis, 1997. "What's in a Name? Reputation as a Tradeable Asset," Working Papers 97033, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
  12. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 280-312, August.
  13. Günther Lang, 2003. "Reputation deals: A theory of endogenous teams," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 31(1), pages 32-50, March.
  14. Shapiro, Carl, 1983. "Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(4), pages 659-79, November.
  15. David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1999. "Reputation and Imperfect Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 238, David K. Levine.
  16. Cabral, L.M.B., 2000. "Stretching Firm and Brand Reputation," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 00-07, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-.
  17. Wilson, Robert, 1985. "Multi-dimensional signalling," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 17-21.
  18. Segendorff, Björn, 2000. "A Signalling Theory of Scapegoats," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 406, Stockholm School of Economics.
  19. Alan Morrison & William J. Wilhelm, Jr., 2003. "Partnership Firms, Reputation and Human Capital," OFRC Working Papers Series 2003fe02, Oxford Financial Research Centre.
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Cited by:
  1. Enrico Sette, 2009. "Sorting, reputation and entry in a market for experts," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 727, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.

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