Share the Fame or Share the Blame? The Reputational Implications of Partnerships
Abstract"We use an adverse selection model to study the dynamics of firms' reputations when firms implement joint projects. We show that in the case of joint projects a firm's reputation does not necessarily increase following a success and does not necessarily decrease following a failure. We also study how reputation considerations affect firms' decisions to participate in joint projects. We show that a high-reputation partner is not necessarily preferable to a low-reputation partner and, when implementation of the joint project by a single firm is possible, a high-quality partner may not be preferable to a low-quality partner." Copyright (c) 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc..
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.
Volume (Year): 19 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (06)
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Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/journals/JEMS/
Other versions of this item:
- Costa, Luis Almeida e & Vasconcelos, Luis, 2008. "Share the Fame or Share the Blame? The Reputational Implications of Partnerships," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp539, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
- L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
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