1. Birger Wernerfelt, 1988. "Umbrella Branding as a Signal of New Product Quality: An Example of Signalling by Posting a Bond," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 458-466, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Douglas Gale & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1994. "Price and Quality Cycles for Experience Goods," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(4), pages 590-607, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Douglas Gale & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1992. "Price and Quality Cycles for Experience Goods," Papers 0035, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
4. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(3), pages 571-99, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 1998. "Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be," CARESS Working Papres rep-is-sep, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, . ""Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be''," CARESS Working Papres 98-11, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
   • George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, . "Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be," Penn CARESS Working Papers bb1b279d6539c9ed3b83a027c, Penn Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
6. repec:att:wimass:19199818 is not listed on IDEAS
7. Diamond, Douglas W, 1989. "Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 828-62, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-41, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Akerlof, George A, 1970. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Holmstrom, Bengt, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 169-82, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Bengt Holmstrom, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," NBER Working Papers 6875, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Tirole, Jean, 1996. "A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality)," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(1), pages 1-22, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Tirole, Jean, 1994. ""A Theory of Collective Reputations" with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality," IDEI Working Papers 38, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    • Tirole, J., 1993. "A Theory of Collective Reputations with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality," Working papers 93-13, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Costa, Luis Almeida e & Vasconcelos, Luis, 2008. "Share the Fame or Share the Blame? The Reputational Implications of Partnerships," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp539, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia. [Downloadable!]
2. Paul Belleflamme & Martin Peitz, 2009. "Asymmetric Information and Overinvestment in Quality," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
3. Joyee Deb, 2008. "Observability and Sorting in a Market for Names," Working Papers 08-25, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
4. Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman, . "Trust in the New Economy," Working Papers 1102, Industrial Relations Center, University of Minnesota (Twin Cities Campus). [Downloadable!]
5. Heski Bar-Isaac, 2004. "Something to Prove: Reputation in teams and hiring to introduce uncertainty," Working Papers 04-07, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
6. Bernardita Vial, 2008. "Competitive Equilibrium and Reputation under Imperfect Public Monitoring," Documentos de Trabajo 327, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.. [Downloadable!]
7. Rudolf Kerschbamer & Muriel Niederle & Josef Perktold, 2000. "Market Institutions and Quality Enforcement," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1482, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
8. Oliver Hart, 2001. "Norms and the Theory of the Firm," NBER Working Papers 8286, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Oliver Hart, 2001. "Norms and the Theory of the Firm," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1923, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
10. Alan Morrison & William J. Wilhelm, Jr., 2003. "Partnership Firms, Reputation and Human Capital," OFRC Working Papers Series 2003fe02, Oxford Financial Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
11. Alan D. Morrison & William J. Wilhelm, 2004. "Partnership Firms, Reputation, and Human Capital," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1682-1692, December. [Downloadable!]
12. Luis Cabral & Ali Hortacsu, 2006. "The Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Evidence from eBay," Working Papers 06-32, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
13. Luis Cabral & Ali Hortacsu, 2004. "The Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Theory and Evidence from eBay," NBER Working Papers 10363, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Cabral, Luís M B & Hortaçsu, Ali, 2004. "The Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Theory and Evidence from eBay," CEPR Discussion Papers 4345, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Luís Cabral & Ali Hortacsu, 2004. "The Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Theory and Evidence from eBay," Working Papers 04-05, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
14. Hendrik Hakenes & Martin Peitz, 2006. "Observable Reputation Trading," Discussion Papers 131, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Hendrik Hakenes & Martin Peitz, 2007. "Observable Reputation Trading," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(2), pages 693-730, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Heski Bar-Isaac, 2001. "Self-Confidence and Survival," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 428, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Heski Bar-Isaac, 2001. "Self-Confidence and Survival," FMG Discussion Papers dp395, Financial Markets Group. [Downloadable!] (restricted)