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Price and Quality Cycles for Experience Goods

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Author Info

  • Douglas Gale

    ()

  • Robert W. Rosenthal

    ()

Abstract

We explore a dynamic, competitive model for experience goods and study an equilibrium for it in which firms plan initially to produce high quality at low price, then high quality at high price, then low quality at high price. Each consumer is aware that all firms eventually intend to run down their reputations at customers' expense, yet he rationally chooses to wait for direct evidence that the firm to which he is attached has already entered into the exploitative phase.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Boston University - Industry Studies Programme in its series Papers with number 0035.

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Date of creation: Jun 1992
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:bostin:0035

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Boston University, Industry Studies Program; Department of Economics, 270 Bay Road, Boston, Massachusetts 02215.
Phone: 617-353-4389
Fax: 617-353-444
Email:
Web page: http://www.bu.edu/econ/isp/
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Cited by:
  1. George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, . "Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be," Penn CARESS Working Papers bb1b279d6539c9ed3b83a027c, Penn Economics Department.
  2. George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2000. "Who Wants a Good Reputation?," CARESS Working Papres sell-rep, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
  3. Luís Cabral & Ali Hortacsu, 2004. "The Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Theory and Evidence from eBay," Working Papers 04-05, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  4. J. Miguel Villas-Boas, 2000. "Competing with Experience Goods," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0771, Econometric Society.
  5. Steven Tadelis, 1999. "What's in a Name? Reputation as a Tradeable Asset," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 548-563, June.
  6. Hortacsu, Ali, 2005. "Trust and Reputation on eBay: Micro and Macro Perspectives," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt8vj7d50q, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.

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