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Double Moral Hazard: an Experiment on Warranties

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  • Giorgio Coricelli
  • Luigi Luini

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Paper provided by Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia in its series CEEL Working Papers with number 9901.

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Date of creation: 1999
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Handle: RePEc:trn:utwpce:9901

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Web page: http://www-ceel.economia.unitn.it
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  1. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-94, July.
  2. Rogerson, William P, 1985. "Repeated Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 69-76, January.
  3. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1985. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Working papers 367, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  4. Golosinski, Dorothy & West, Douglas S, 1995. "Double Moral Hazard and Shopping Center Similarity in Canada," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 456-78, October.
  5. Russell Cooper & T.W. Ross, 1984. "Product Warranties and Double Moral Hazard," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 716, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  6. Emons, Winand, 1988. "Warranties, moral hazard, and the lemons problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 16-33, October.
  7. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 1971. "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organizations," UCLA Economics Working Papers 10A, UCLA Department of Economics.
  8. Brandts, Jordi & Holt, Charles A., 1995. "Limitations of dominance and forward induction: Experimental evidence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 391-395, October.
  9. Davis Douglas D. & Holt Charles A., 1994. "Equilibrium Cooperation in Three-Person, Choice-of-Partner Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 39-53, July.
  10. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Maskin, Eric, 1987. "Monopoly with asymmetric information about quality : Behavior and regulation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-2), pages 483-489.
  11. Nelson, Phillip, 1970. "Information and Consumer Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(2), pages 311-29, March-Apr.
  12. Emons, Winand, 1989. "On the Limitation of Warranty Duration," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(3), pages 287-301, March.
  13. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
  14. Holt, Charles A & Sherman, Roger, 1990. "Advertising and Product Quality in Posted-Offer Experiments," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 28(1), pages 39-56, January.
  15. Shapiro, Carl, 1983. "Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(4), pages 659-79, November.
  16. Camerer, Colin & Weigelt, Keith, 1988. "Experimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium Reputation Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(1), pages 1-36, January.
  17. Rubin, Paul H, 1978. "The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 223-33, April.
  18. Cho, In-Koo & Kreps, David M, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221, May.
  19. Russell Cooper & Thomas W. Ross, 1988. "An Intertemporal Model of Warranties," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 21(1), pages 72-86, February.
  20. Berkowitz, M K & Kotowitz, Y, 1993. "Promotions as Work Incentives," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 31(3), pages 342-53, July.
  21. John Kambhu, 1982. "Optimal Product Quality under Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 483-492, Autumn.
  22. Steven Shavell, 1979. "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 55-73, Spring.
  23. Miller, Ross M & Plott, Charles R, 1985. "Product Quality Signaling in Experimental Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 837-72, July.
  24. Grossman, Sanford J, 1981. "The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 461-83, December.
  25. Heal, Geoffrey, 1976. "Do Bad Products Drive Out Good?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(3), pages 499-502, August.
  26. Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
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