Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to follow this author

Robert W. Rosenthal

Contents:

This is information that was supplied by Robert Rosenthal in registering through RePEc. If you are Robert W. Rosenthal , you may change this information at the RePEc Author Service. Or if you are not registered and would like to be listed as well, register at the RePEc Author Service. When you register or update your RePEc registration, you may identify the papers and articles you have authored.

Personal Details

First Name: Robert
Middle Name: W.
Last Name: Rosenthal
Suffix:

RePEc Short-ID: pro267

Homepage: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_W._Rosenthal
Postal Address:
Phone:

Affiliation

This author is deceased (Date: 07 Feb 2002)

Lists

This author is featured on the following reading lists, publication compilations or Wikipedia entries:
  1. Robert W. Rosenthal in Wikipedia (English)

Works

as in new window

Working papers

  1. Robert W. Rosenthal & Jason Shachat & Mark Walker, 2003. "Hide and Seek in Arizona," Experimental, EconWPA 0312001, EconWPA.
  2. Maria Angeles de Frutos & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1997. "On Some Myths about Sequenced Common-value Auctions," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme 0077, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  3. Douglas Gale & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1996. "Experimentation, Imitation, and Stochastic Stability," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme 0065, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  4. Robert W. Rosenthal & Ruqu Wang, 1995. "Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies and Common Values," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme 0060, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  5. Krishna, V. & Rosenthal, R.W., 1995. "Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies," Papers, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics 04-95-06, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
  6. Yongmin Chen & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1994. "On the Use of Ceiling-Price Commitments by Monopolists," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme 0045, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  7. Yongmin Chen & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1993. "Asking Prices as Commitment Devices," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme 0042, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  8. Robert W. Rosenthal, 1992. "Bargaining Rules of Thumb," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme 0033, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  9. Robert W. Rosenthal, 1992. "Rules of Thumb in Games," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme 0034, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  10. Yongmin Chen & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1992. "Dynamic Duopoly with Slowly Changing Customer Loyalties," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme 0037, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  11. Douglas Gale & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1992. "Price and Quality Cycles for Experience Goods," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme 0035, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  12. Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1990. "Some Inefficiency Implication of Generational Politics and Exchange," NBER Working Papers 3354, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Raquel Fernandez & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1989. "Sovereign-Debt Renegotiations Revisted," NBER Working Papers 2981, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Raquel Fernandez & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1988. "Sovereign-debt Renegotiations: A Strategic Analysis," NBER Working Papers 2597, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Assaf Razin & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1988. "A Strategic Altruism Model In Which Ricardian Equivalence Does Not Hold," NBER Working Papers 2699, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Jovanovic, Boyan & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1986. "Anonymous Sequential Games," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University 86-12, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  17. Robert W. Rosenthal, 1976. "Market Games with Production and Public Commodities," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 156, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  18. Ehud Kalai & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1976. "Arbitration of Two-Party Disputes Under Ignorance," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 215, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  19. Robert W. Rosenthal, 1975. "Induced Outcomes in Cooperative Normal-Form Games," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 178, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  20. Robert W. Rosenthal, 1975. "Lindahl's Solution and Values for A Public-Goods Example," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 132, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  21. Robert W. Rosenthal, 1975. "An Arbitration Model for Normal-Form Games," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 121, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  22. Robert W. Rosenthal, 1974. "Sufficient Conditions for Insensitivity in Linear Models," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 91, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  23. Andrew Postlewaite & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1973. "Disadvantageous Syndicates," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 40, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  24. Robert W. Rosenthal, 1973. "Correlated Equilibria in Some Classes of Two-Person Games," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 45, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  25. ROSENTHAL, Robert W., . "Voting majority sizes," CORE Discussion Papers RP, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -221, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  26. CHAMPSAUR, Paul & ROBERTS, Donald John & ROSENTHAL, Robert W., . "On cores in economies with public goods," CORE Discussion Papers RP, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -233, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

Articles

  1. Szentes, Balazs & Rosenthal, Robert W., 2003. "Three-object two-bidder simultaneous auctions: chopsticks and tetrahedra," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 114-133, July.
  2. Robert W. Rosenthal & Jason Shachat & Mark Walker, 2003. "Hide and seek in Arizona," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 273-293, December.
  3. Szentes, Balazs & Rosenthal, Robert W., 2003. "Beyond chopsticks: Symmetric equilibria in majority auction games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 278-295, November.
  4. Dale, Donald J. & Morgan, John & Rosenthal, Robert W., 2002. "Coordination through Reputations: A Laboratory Experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 52-88, January.
  5. Robert W. Rosenthal, 2001. "Trust and social efficiencies," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 413-428.
  6. Gale, Douglas & Rosenthal, Robert W., 2001. "Experimentation, Imitation, and Stochastic Stability: Addendum," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 164-174, March.
  7. Lang, Kevin & Rosenthal, Robert W, 2001. "Bargaining Piecemeal or All at Once?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(473), pages 526-40, July.
  8. Gale, Douglas & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1999. "Experimentation, Imitation, and Stochastic Stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 1-40, January.
  9. Angeles de Frutos, Maria & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1998. "On Some Myths about Sequenced Common-Value Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 201-221, May.
  10. Rosenthal, Robert, 1997. "Some issues in the replication of social science research," Labour Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 121-123, June.
  11. Krishna, Vijay & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1996. "Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 1-31, November.
  12. Yongmin Chen & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1996. "On the Use of Ceiling-Price Commitments by Monopolists," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(2), pages 207-220, Summer.
  13. Rosenthal, Robert W. & Wang, Ruqu, 1996. "Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies and Common Values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 32-55, November.
  14. Chen, Yongmin & Rosenthal, Robert W, 1996. "Asking Prices as Commitment Devices," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(1), pages 129-55, February.
  15. Chen, Yongmin & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1996. "Dynamic duopoly with slowly changing customer loyalties," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 269-296, May.
  16. Douglas Gale & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1994. "Price and Quality Cycles for Experience Goods," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(4), pages 590-607, Winter.
  17. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1993. "Bargaining rules of thumb," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 15-24, September.
  18. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1993. "Rules of thumb in games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-13, September.
  19. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1993. "Suicide attempts and signalling games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 25-33, July.
  20. Robert W. Rosenthal & Ruqu Wang, 1993. "An Explanation of Inefficiency in Markets and a Justification for Buy-and-Hold Strategies," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 26(3), pages 609-24, August.
  21. Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1993. "Some Inefficiency Implications Of Generational Politics And Exchange," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(1), pages 27-42, 03.
  22. Glazer, Jacob & Rosenthal, Robert W, 1992. "A Note on Abreu-Matsushima Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1435-38, November.
  23. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1991. "A note on robustness of equilibria with respect to commitment opportunities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 237-243, May.
  24. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1991. "On the incentives associated with sovereign debt," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 30(1-2), pages 167-176, February.
  25. Kevin Lang & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1991. "The Contractors' Game," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(3), pages 329-338, Autumn.
  26. Fernandez, Raquel & Rosenthal, Robert W, 1990. "Strategic Models of Sovereign-Debt Renegotiations," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 331-49, July.
  27. Kotlikoff, Laurence J & Razin, Assaf & Rosenthal, Robert W, 1990. "A Strategic Altruism Model in Which Ricardian Equivalence Does Not Hold," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(403), pages 1261-68, December.
  28. Brown, James N & Rosenthal, Robert W, 1990. "Testing the Minimax Hypothesis: A Re-examination of O'Neill's Game Experiment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1065-81, September.
  29. Rosenthal, Robert W, 1989. "A Bounded-Rationality Approach to the Study of Noncooperative Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 273-91.
  30. Robert W. Rosenthal & Richard H. Spady, 1989. "Duopoly with Both Ruin and Entry," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 22(4), pages 834-51, November.
  31. Masso, Jordi & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1989. "More on the "anti-folk theorem"," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 281-290, June.
  32. Jovanovic, Boyan & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1988. "Anonymous sequential games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 77-87, February.
  33. Rosenthal, Robert W, 1986. "Dynamic Duopoly with Incomplete Customer Loyalties," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(2), pages 399-406, June.
  34. Fishburn, Peter C. & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1986. "Noncooperative games and nontransitive preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 1-7, August.
  35. Friedman, James W. & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1986. "A positive approach to non-cooperative games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 235-251, September.
  36. Constantinides, George M. & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1984. "Strategic analysis of the competitive exercise of certain financial options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 128-138, February.
  37. Rosenthal, Robert W & Weiss, Andrew, 1984. "Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium in a Market with Asymmetric Information," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(2), pages 333-42, April.
  38. Rosenthal, Robert W, 1982. "A Dynamic Oligopoly Game with Lags in Demand: More on the Monotonicity of Price in the Number of Sellers," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 23(2), pages 353-60, June.
  39. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1982. "A dynamic model of duopoly with customer loyalties," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 69-76, June.
  40. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1982. "A model of far-sighted electoral competition," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 289-297, April.
  41. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1981. "Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 92-100, August.
  42. Rosenthal, Robert W, 1980. "A Model in Which an Increase in the Number of Sellers Leads to a Higher Price," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 48(6), pages 1575-79, September.
  43. Rosenthal, R W, 1979. "Sequences of Games with Varying Opponents," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 47(6), pages 1353-66, November.
  44. Rosenthal, Robert W, 1978. "Arbitration of Two-party Disputes under Uncertainty," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(3), pages 595-604, October.
  45. Aumann, R. J. & Gardner, R. J. & Rosenthal, R. W., 1977. "Core and value for a public-goods economy: An example," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 363-365, August.
  46. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1976. "Lindahl's solution and values for a public-goods example," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 37-41, March.
  47. Rosenthal, Robert W, 1975. "Voting Majority Sizes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 43(2), pages 293-99, March.
  48. Champsaur, Paul & Roberts, Donald John & Rosenthal, Robert W, 1975. "On Cores in Economies with Public Goods," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 16(3), pages 751-64, October.
  49. Postlewaite, Andrew & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1974. "Disadvantageous syndicates," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 324-326, November.
  50. Joseph T. Howson, Jr. & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1974. "Bayesian Equilibria of Finite Two-Person Games with Incomplete Information," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 21(3), pages 313-315, November.
  51. Rosenthal, Robert W, 1973. "Taxation vs. Prohibition of an External Diseconomy by Direct Vote: A Game Theoretic Approach," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 14(2), pages 414-20, June.
  52. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1972. "Cooperative games in effectiveness form," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 88-101, August.
  53. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1971. "External economies and cores," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 182-188, June.

Books

  1. Rosenthal,Robert, 2009. "Judgment Studies," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521101479.

NEP Fields

1 paper by this author was announced in NEP, and specifically in the following field reports (number of papers):
  1. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (1) 2003-12-14. Author is listed

Statistics

This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
  1. Average Rank Score
  2. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  3. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  4. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors
  5. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  6. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  7. Number of Citations
  8. Number of Citations, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  9. Number of Citations, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor, Discounted by Citation Age
  10. Number of Citations, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  11. Number of Citations, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor, Discounted by Citation Age
  12. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors
  13. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors, Discounted by Citation Age
  14. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  15. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors, Discounted by Citation Age
  16. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  17. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors, Discounted by Citation Age
  18. h-index
  19. Number of Registered Citing Authors
  20. Number of Registered Citing Authors, Weighted by Rank (Max. 1 per Author)
  21. Number of Journal Pages
  22. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  23. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  24. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors
  25. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  26. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  27. Closeness measure in co-authorship network
  28. Betweenness measure in co-authorship network
  29. Wu-Index
  30. Strength of students

Most cited item

Most downloaded item (past 12 months)

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

Corrections

For general information on how to correct material on RePEc, see these instructions.

To update listings or check citations waiting for approval, Robert Rosenthal should log into the RePEc Author Service

To make corrections to the bibliographic information of a particular item, find the technical contact on the abstract page of that item. There, details are also given on how to add or correct references and citations.

To link different versions of the same work, where versions have a different title, use this form. Note that if the versions have a very similar title and are in the author's profile, the links will usually be created automatically.

Please note that most corrections can take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.