Firm reputation with hidden information
AbstractAn adverse selection model of firm reputation is developed in which short-lived clients purchase services from firms operated by overlapping generations of agents. A firm's only asset is its name, or reputation, and trade of names is not observed by clients. As a result, names are traded in all equilibria regardless of the economy's horizon The general equilibrium analysis links the value of a name to the market for services. This causes a non-monotonicity that precludes higher types from sorting themselves through the market for names, and leads to “sensible” dynamics: reputations, and name prices, increase after success and decrease after failure. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 21 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (03)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm
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- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
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