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Team versus individual reputations : a model of interaction and some empirical evidence

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Author Info

  • Olivier Gergaud

    () (OMI et TEAM)

  • Florine Livat

    (OMI)

Abstract

How do individuals, goods or services (e.g. researchers) through their own reputation give birth to a group's reputation (e.g. a laboratory) and conversely how do they take advantage of this group's reputation. Do they contribute to (derive benefit from) the group's reputation proportionally to their individual reputation or in a different way? To answer these questions we develop in this paper a theoretical model in which collective reputation both determines and is determined -simultaneously- by individual reputations as suggested first by Tirole (1996). This paper also proposes an empirical strategy to assess both umbrella impacts (the impact of a collective reputation on a given individual reputation) and contributions to the umbrella (the contrary). Then, the theoretical model is applied to the case of Bordeaux wines from a rich dataset on individual opinions.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1) in its series Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques with number bla04015.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mse:wpsorb:bla04015

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Keywords: Individual reputation; collective reputation; cultural goods.;

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References

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  1. Andersson, Fredrik, 2002. "Pooling reputations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(5), pages 715-730, May.
  2. Choi, Jay Pil, 1998. "Brand Extension as Informational Leverage," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(4), pages 655-69, October.
  3. Joshua Angrist & Alan Krueger, 2001. "Instrumental Variables and the Search for Identification: From Supply and Demand to Natural Experiments," Working Papers 834, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
  4. Choi, Chong Ju & Soo Hee Lee & Donghoon Oh, 1995. "The strategy of grouping and reputation linkage in clubs and multi-product firms," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 521-533, September.
  5. Birger Wernerfelt, 1988. "Umbrella Branding as a Signal of New Product Quality: An Example of Signalling by Posting a Bond," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 458-466, Autumn.
  6. Jarrell, Gregg & Peltzman, Sam, 1985. "The Impact of Product Recalls on the Wealth of Sellers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 512-36, June.
  7. Shapiro, Carl, 1983. "Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(4), pages 659-79, November.
  8. Darby, Michael R & Karni, Edi, 1973. "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 67-88, April.
  9. Sullivan, Mary, 1990. "Measuring Image Spillovers in Umbrella-Branded Products," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63(3), pages 309-29, July.
  10. Choi, Jay Pil, 2003. "Bundling new products with old to signal quality, with application to the sequencing of new products," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(8), pages 1179-1200, October.
  11. Tirole, Jean, 1996. "A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality)," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(1), pages 1-22, January.
  12. Steven Tadelis, 2002. "The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(4), pages 854-882, August.
  13. Nelson, Phillip, 1970. "Information and Consumer Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(2), pages 311-29, March-Apr.
  14. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-41, August.
  15. Borenstein, Severin & Zimmerman, Martin B, 1988. "Market Incentives for Safe Commercial Airline Operation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 913-35, December.
  16. Steven Tadelis, 2003. "Firm reputation with hidden information," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 635-651, 03.
  17. Nelson, Philip, 1974. "Advertising as Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(4), pages 729-54, July/Aug..
  18. Landon, Stuart & Smith, Constance, 1998. "Quality expectations, reputation, and price," MPRA Paper 9774, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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Cited by:
  1. Roberta Sisto & Emilio De Meo & Antonio Lopolito, 2006. "Quality, Coordination and Collective Reputation in the San Severo Wine Production System," Quaderni DSEMS 17-2006, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia.
  2. Gergaud, Olivier & Livat, Florine, 2007. "How do consumers use signals to assess quality?," Working Papers 37296, American Association of Wine Economists.

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