This paper develops a theory of umbrella branding as a way to link the reputations of otherwise unrelated products. I show that while umbrella branding can credibly signal positive quality correlation, there are no equilibria in which umbrella branding either fully reveals high quality, or signals negative quality correlation. Finally, whenever umbrella branding signals perfect positive quality correlation, firms that already produce high quality products have stronger incentives to invest in developing further high quality products than firms that are currently inactive or produce low quality products.
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number
11045.
Find related papers by JEL classification: M31 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Marketing L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Hendrik Hakenes & Martin Peitz, 2006.
"Umbrella Branding and the Provision of Quality,"
Discussion Papers
132, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
[Downloadable!]
Gene M. Grossman & Carl Shapiro, 1988.
"Counterfeit-Product Trade,"
NBER Working Papers
1876, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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