I consider an adverse selection model of firm reputation. Each firm is characterized by an exogenously given quality level, which is the firm's private information and applies to any product it sells. Consumers observe the performance of the firm's products, which is positively related to the firm's quality level.
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Length: 26 pages Date of creation: 2000 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:nystfi:00-07
Contact details of provider: Postal: U.S.A.; New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics . 44 West 4th Street. New York, New York 10012-1126 Web page: http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/finance/ More information through EDIRC
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior D24 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Production; Capital and Total Factor Productivity; Capacity D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
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Fishman, Arthur & Finkelshtain, Israel & Simhon, Avi & Yacouel, Nira, 2008.
"The Economics of Collective Brands,"
Discussion Papers
46056, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Department of Agricultural Economics and Management.
[Downloadable!]
Hendrik Hakenes & Martin Peitz, 2006.
"Umbrella Branding and the Provision of Quality,"
Discussion Papers
132, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Hendrik Hakenes & Martin Peitz, 2006.
"Observable Reputation Trading,"
Discussion Papers
131, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Hendrik Hakenes & Martin Peitz, 2007.
"Observable Reputation Trading,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(2), pages 693-730, 05.
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