Umbrella branding and the provision of quality
AbstractConsider a two-product firm that decides on the quality of each product. Product quality is unknown to consumers. If the firm sells both products under the same brand name, consumers adjust their beliefs about quality subject to the performance of both products. We show that if the probability that low quality will be detected is in an intermediate range, the firm produces high quality under umbrella branding whereas it would sell low quality in the absence of umbrella branding. Hence, umbrella branding mitigates the moral hazard problem. We also find that umbrella branding survives in asymmetric markets and that one product may even be sold at a loss to stabilize the umbrella brand. In general, umbrella branding does not necessarily imply high quality; the firm may choose low-quality products with positive probability.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal International Journal of Industrial Organization.
Volume (Year): 26 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505551
Other versions of this item:
- Hakenes, Hendrik & Peitz, Martin, 2006. "Umbrella Branding and the Provision of Quality," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 132, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Hendrik Hakenes & Martin Peitz, 2004. "Umbrella Branding and the Provision of Quality," CESifo Working Paper Series 1373, CESifo Group Munich.
- Hakenes, Hendrik & Peitz, Martin, 2004. "Umbrella Branding and the Provision of Quality," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 04-51, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
- M37 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Advertising
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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