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Information and Economic Efficiency

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Author Info
Richard Arnott
Bruce Greenwald
Joseph E. Stiglitz

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Abstract

Is an economy with adverse selection, moral hazard, or an incomplete set of risk markets "constrained" Pareto efficient? There are two sets of papers addressing this question, one asserting that, under seemingly quite general conditions, the economy is constrained Pareto efficient, the other (to which we have contributed) that it is not. In this paper, we delineate the differences in assumptions between the two sets of papers, and under our assumptions present an intuitive proof of the Pareto inefficiency of market equilibrium with moral hazard and identify what it is that the government can do that the market cannot.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 4533.

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Date of creation: Aug 1995
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Publication status: published as Information Economics and Policy Vol. 6 (1994), pp. 77-88
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:4533

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Grossman, Sanford J., 1977. "A characterization of the optimality of equilibrium in incomplete markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 1-15, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Arnott, Richard J & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1985. "Labor Turnover, Wage Structures, and Moral Hazard: The Inefficiency of Competitive Markets," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(4), pages 434-62, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Geanakoplos, J. & Magill, M. & Quinzii, M. & Dreze, J., 1990. "Generic inefficiency of stock market equilibrium when markets are incomplete," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 113-151. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Greenwald, Bruce C & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1986. "Externalities in Economies with Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(2), pages 229-64, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Newbery, David M G & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1982. "The Choice of Techniques and the Optimality of Market Equilibrium with Rational Expectations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(2), pages 223-46, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Shavell, Steven, 1979. "On Moral Hazard and Insurance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 541-62, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Prescott, Edward C & Townsend, Robert M, 1984. "Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 21-45, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Joseph Stiglitz & Jungyoll Yun, 2002. "Integration of Unemployment Insurance with Retirement Insurance," NBER Working Papers 9199, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Bel? Jerez, 2000. "General Equilibrium with Asymmetric Information: a Dual Approach," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 510.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Thomas Schuster, 2003. "News Events and Price Movements. Price Effects of Economic and Non-Economic Publications in the News Media," Finance 0305009, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  4. Bel? Jerez, 2001. "A Dual Characterization of Incentive Efficiency," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 494.01, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Kherallah, Mylène & Kirsten, Johann, 2001. "The new institutional economics," MTID discussion papers 41, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). [Downloadable!]
  6. Belén Jerez, 2003. "Incentive Compatibility And Pricing Under Moral Hazard," Economics Working Papers we035722, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Konrad, Kai A, 1999. "Privacy, Time Consistent Optimal Labour Income Taxation and Education Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 2326, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Kherallah, Mylène & Kirsten, Johann, 2001. "The new institutional economics," MSSD discussion papers 41, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). [Downloadable!]
  9. Luca, PANACCIONE, 2006. "Inefficiency of competitive equilibrium with hidden action and financial markets," Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques Working Paper 2006049, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]
  10. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2002. "Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(3), pages 460-501, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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