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Signalling with Many Signals

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Author Info
Engers, Maxim
Abstract

This paper examines a market with asymmetric information where there are many signals available and where both the costs of signaling and the product value may depend on many privately known characteristics. Under a weak condition on the relationship between the marginal cost of increasing the signals and the product value, a separating set exists whereby the value of every seller's product is inferred from the seller's optimal choice of signals. The separating set constructed is Pareto dominant and corresponds to recently proposed equilibrium notions in signaling and screening models. Copyright 1987 by The Econometric Society.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 55 (1987)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
Pages: 663-74
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:55:y:1987:i:3:p:663-74

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  1. Nick Feltovich & Rick Harbaugh & Ted To, 1998. "Too Cool for School? A Theory of Countersignaling," Game Theory and Information 9811002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Sibert, Anne, 2006. "Is Central Bank Transparency Desirable?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5641, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Silvia Rossetto, 2008. "The price of rapid exit in venture capital-backed IPOs," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 29-53, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Gottlieb, Daniel & Moreira, Humberto Luiz Ataide & Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de, 2004. "A model of mixed signals with applications to countersignaling an the GED," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 553, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
  5. Sanghoon Lee, 2007. "The Timing Of Signaling: To Study In High School Or In College?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(3), pages 785-807, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Nick Feltovich & Rick Harbaugh & Ted To, . "Signaling and Countersignaling: A Theory of Understatement," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 1999-21, Claremont Colleges. [Downloadable!]
  7. Michael Smart, 1996. "Competitive Insurance Markets with Two Unobservables," Working Papers msmart-96-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Ettore Damiano & Hao Li & Wing Suen, 2006. "Credible Ratings," Working Papers tecipa-219, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Bernhardt, Dan & Robertson, Fiona J., 1993. "Testing Dividend Signalling Models," Working Papers 828, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Laurent Linnemer, 2008. "Dissipative Advertising Signals Quality even without Repeat Purchases," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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