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The Timing Of Signaling: To Study In High School Or In College?

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  • Sanghoon Lee

Abstract

American students study harder in college than in high school, whereas East Asian students study harder in high school than in college. This article proposes a signaling explanation. Signaling may occur over time both in high school and in college, and societies may differ in the timing of signaling. Students work harder in the signaling stage determined by the society as a whole. A testable implication is that high ability workers in East Asia are more concentrated among a few colleges than their U.S. counterparts. This implication is confirmed by top CEO education profile data in the United States and Korea. Copyright 2007 by the Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 48 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (08)
Pages: 785-807

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Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:48:y:2007:i:3:p:785-807

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  1. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(2), pages 443-59, March.
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  5. Wößmann, Ludger, 2003. "Schooling resources, educational institutions and student performance: The international evidence," Munich Reprints in Economics 19661, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  6. Cole, Harold L & Mailath, George J & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1992. "Social Norms, Savings Behavior, and Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(6), pages 1092-1125, December.
  7. Cho, In-Koo & Sobel, Joel, 1990. "Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 381-413, April.
  8. Eric A. Hanushek & Javier A. Luque, 2002. "Efficiency and Equity in Schools around the World," NBER Working Papers 8949, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August.
  10. Engers, Maxim, 1987. "Signalling with Many Signals," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(3), pages 663-74, May.
  11. Hanming Fang, 2001. "Social Culture and Economic Performance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 924-937, September.
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Cited by:
  1. Gerald Eisenkopf, 2008. "Student Selection and Incentives," TWI Research Paper Series 42, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
  2. Masashi Tanaka, 2013. "Human capital investment, Signaling, and Wage differentials," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 13-31, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP).
  3. Dong, Baomin & Fu, Shihe & Gong, Jiong & Fan, Hanwen, 2014. "The Lame Drain," MPRA Paper 53825, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Bergh, Andreas & Fink, Günther, 2009. "Higher education, elite institutions and inequality," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 376-384, April.

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