The Timing Of Signaling: To Study In High School Or In College?
AbstractAmerican students study harder in college than in high school, whereas East Asian students study harder in high school than in college. This article proposes a signaling explanation. Signaling may occur over time both in high school and in college, and societies may differ in the timing of signaling. Students work harder in the signaling stage determined by the society as a whole. A testable implication is that high ability workers in East Asia are more concentrated among a few colleges than their U.S. counterparts. This implication is confirmed by top CEO education profile data in the United States and Korea. Copyright 2007 by the Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 48 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (08)
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