Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types

Contents:

Author Info

  • Forges, Francoise
  • Koessler, Frederic

Abstract

This paper studies the set of equilibria that can be achieved by adding general communication systems to Bayesian games in which some information can be certified or, equivalently, in which players' types are partially verifiable. Certifiability of information is formalized by a set of available reports for each player that varies with the true state of the world. Given these state-dependent sets of reports, we characterize canonical equilibria for which generalized versions of the revelation principle are valid. Communication equilibria and associated canonical representations are obtained as special cases when no information can be certified.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VBY-4F1H013-2/2/5e3cbf3397bf22719c318df50e034e99
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

Volume (Year): 41 (2005)
Issue (Month): 7 (November)
Pages: 793-811

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:41:y:2005:i:7:p:793-811

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Verrecchia, Robert E., 2001. "Essays on disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 97-180, December.
  2. Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2002. "Hard Evidence and Mechanism Design," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, UC San Diego qt7715f08f, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
  3. Forges, F., 1987. "Can sunspots replace a mediator ?," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 1987045, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
  5. Paul R. Milgrom, 1979. "Good Nevs and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 407R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  6. Ingela Alger & Régis Renault, 2006. "Screening Ethics When Honest Agents Care About Fairness ," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(1), pages 59-85, 02.
  7. Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, 1996. "Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 103-118, Summer.
  8. Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro & Postlewaite, Andrew & Suzumura, Kotaro, 1990. "Strategic Information Revelation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(1), pages 25-47, January.
  9. Green, Jerry R & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1986. "Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 447-56, July.
  10. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
  11. Deneckere,R. & Severinov,S., 2001. "Mechanism design and communication costs," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems 23, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  12. F. Forges, 2010. "An Approach to Communication Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 516, David K. Levine.
  13. Amparo Urbano & Jose E. Vila, 2002. "Computational Complexity and Communication: Coordination in Two-Player Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 1893-1927, September.
  14. Myerson, Roger B, 1986. "Multistage Games with Communication," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 323-58, March.
  15. Hyun Song Shin, 2003. "Disclosures and Asset Returns," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 105-133, January.
  16. Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, . "Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research 23-79, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
  17. Ingela Alger & Ching-to Albert Ma, 2001. "Moral Hazard, Insurance, and Some Collusion," Boston College Working Papers in Economics, Boston College Department of Economics 496, Boston College Department of Economics.
  18. Frédéric KOESSLER, 2001. "Persuasion Games with Higher Order Uncertainty," Working Papers of BETA, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg 2001-14, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  19. Grossman, Sanford J, 1981. "The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 461-83, December.
  20. D'ASPREMONT, Claude & BHATTACHARYA, Sudipto & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, . "Bargaining and sharing innovative knowledge," CORE Discussion Papers RP, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -1465, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  21. Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2002. "Long Cheap Talk," Discussion Paper Series, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem dp284, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, revised Nov 2002.
  22. Baliga, Sandeep & Morris, Stephen, 2002. "Co-ordination, Spillovers, and Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 450-468, August.
  23. Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2002. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 1865-1892, September.
  24. Gerardi, Dino, 2004. "Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 104-131, January.
  25. Forges, F., 1987. "Universal mechanisms," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 1987004, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  26. Lipman Barton L. & Seppi Duane J., 1995. "Robust Inference in Communication Games with Partial Provability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 370-405, August.
  27. A. Rubinstein & J. Glazer, . "Debates and Decisions, On a Rationale of Argumentation Rules," Princeton Economic Theory Papers, Economics Department, Princeton University 00s7, Economics Department, Princeton University.
  28. Koessler, Frederic, 2004. "Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 292-320, August.
  29. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-51, November.
  30. Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 2004. "The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 147-179, August.
  31. Daniel J. Seidmann & Eyal Winter, 1997. "Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 65(1), pages 163-170, January.
  32. Myerson, Roger B., 1994. "Communication, correlated equilibria and incentive compatibility," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 24, pages 827-847 Elsevier.
  33. Wolinsky, Asher, 2003. "Information transmission when the sender's preferences are uncertain," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 319-326, February.
  34. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 2000. "The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget-Constrained Buyer," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 198-233, June.
  35. Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 2003. "Cheap talk in games with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 45-71, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:41:y:2005:i:7:p:793-811. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.