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Strategic Knowledge Sharing in Bayesian Games: A General Model

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  • Frédéric KOESSLER

Abstract

This paper provides a general model for the study of strategic knowledge sharing in any finite Bayesian game. Unlike earlier papers on strategic information revelation, higher-order uncertainties can be incorporated into the model. We propose an equilibrium concept, called knowledge equilibrium, which takes into account voluntary, public, and decentralized communication possibilities of exogenously certifiable statements. After the communication stage, beliefs are explicitly deduced from consistent possibility correspondences, without making reference to sequences of perturbed games. Several properties of knowledge equilibria and revised knowledge are examined. In particular, it is shown that a knowledge equilibrium is always a sequential equilibrium of the associated extensive form game with communication.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg in its series Working Papers of BETA with number 2002-01.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2002-01

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Keywords: Strategic information revelation; Interactive knowledge; Bayesian games; Knowledge revision; Consistent beliefs.;

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References

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  1. Modica, Salvatore & Rustichini, Aldo, 1999. "Unawareness and Partitional Information Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 265-298, May.
  2. V. Crawford & J. Sobel, 2010. "Strategic Information Transmission," Levine's Working Paper Archive 544, David K. Levine.
  3. Glazer, J. & Rubinstein, A., 1997. "Debates and Decisions: On a Rationale of Argumentation Rules," Papers, Tel Aviv 17-97, Tel Aviv.
  4. David M Kreps & Robert Wilson, 2003. "Sequential Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000813, David K. Levine.
  5. Lipman Barton L. & Seppi Duane J., 1995. "Robust Inference in Communication Games with Partial Provability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 370-405, August.
  6. Daniel J. Seidmann & Eyal Winter, 1997. "Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 65(1), pages 163-170, January.
  7. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2000. "Global Games: Theory and Applications," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1275R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Aug 2001.
  8. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 236-260, April.
  9. Parikh, Rohit & Krasucki, Paul, 1990. "Communication, consensus, and knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 178-189, October.
  10. Forges, F., 1987. "Universal mechanisms," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 1987004, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  11. Krasucki, Paul, 1996. "Protocols Forcing Consensus," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 266-272, July.
  12. Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, 1996. "Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 103-118, Summer.
  13. John Geanakoplos, 1989. "Game Theory Without Partitions, and Applications to Speculation and Consensus," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 914, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  14. Eddie Dekel & Barton L. Lipman & Aldo Rustichini, 1998. "Standard State-Space Models Preclude Unawareness," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 66(1), pages 159-174, January.
  15. Frédéric KOESSLER, 2002. "Strategic Knowledge Sharing in Bayesian Games: Applications," Working Papers of BETA, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg 2002-02, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  16. Fishman, Michael J & Hagerty, Kathleen M, 1990. "The Optimal Amount of Discretion to Allow in Disclosure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 105(2), pages 427-44, May.
  17. Grossman, Sanford J, 1981. "The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 461-83, December.
  18. Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro & Postlewaite, Andrew & Suzumura, Kotaro, 1990. "Strategic Information Revelation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(1), pages 25-47, January.
  19. Shin Hyun Song, 1994. "The Burden of Proof in a Game of Persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 253-264, October.
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Cited by:
  1. Frédéric KOESSLER, 2002. "Strategic Knowledge Sharing in Bayesian Games: Applications," Working Papers of BETA, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg 2002-02, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  2. Koessler, Frederic, 2004. "Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 292-320, August.

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