Debates often serve as intitutions of mechanisms for resolving conflicts and making decisions. In this paper , we present a simple model in order to explain two phenomena concerning debate rules.
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Paper provided by Tel Aviv in its series Papers with number
17-97.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
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Sendhil Mullainathan & Joshua Schwartzstein & Andrei Shleifer, 2006.
"Coarse Thinking and Persuasion,"
NBER Working Papers
12720, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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