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Cheap talk in games with incomplete information

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Ben-Porath, Elchanan
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 108 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 45-71
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:108:y:2003:i:1:p:45-71

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  1. Heller, Yuval, 2005. "Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol," MPRA Paper 7716, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 Feb 2008. [Downloadable!]
  2. Anirban Kar, Indrajit Ray and Robedrto Serrano, 2005. "Multiple Equilibria as a Difficulty in Understanding Correlated Distributions," Discussion Papers 05-18, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Olivier Gossner & Abraham Neyman & Penélope Hernández, 2005. "Optimal Use Of Communication Resources," Working Papers. Serie AD 2005-06, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Helmut Bester & Roland Strausz, 2003. "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication," Discussion Papers 2, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Peter Vida, 2005. "A Detail-free Mediator and the 3 Player Case," IEHAS Discussion Papers 0511, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  6. Francoise Forges & Frederic Koessler, 2006. "Long Persuasion Games," THEMA Working Papers 2006-01, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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