Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication
AbstractWe study the effects of communication in Bayesian games when the players are sequentially rational but some combinations of types have zero probability. Not all communication equilibria can be implemented as sequential equilibria. We define the set of strong sequential equilibria (SSCE) and characterize it. SSCE differs from the concept of sequential communication equilibrium (SCE) defined by Myerson (1986) in that SCE allows the possibility of trembles by the mediator. We show that these two concepts coincide when there are three or more players, but the set of SSCE may be strictly smaller than the set of SCE for two-player games.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 60 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Other versions of this item:
- Dino Gerardi & Roger B. Myerson, 2005. "Sequential Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Communication," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1542, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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