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Sequential Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Communication

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Author Info
Dino Gerardi () (Cowles Foundation, Yale University)
Roger B. Myerson (Dept. of Economics, University of Chicago)

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Abstract

We study the effects of communication in Bayesian games when the players are sequentially rational but some combinations of types have zero probability. Not all communication equilibria can be implemented as sequential equilibria. We define the set of strong sequential equilibria (SSCE) and characterize it. SSCE differs from the concept of sequential communication equilibrium (SCE) defined by Myerson (1986) in that SCE allows the possibility of trembles by the mediator. We show that these two concepts coincide when there are three or more players, but the set of SSCE may be strictly smaller than the set of SCE for two-player games.

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File URL: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d15a/d1542.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Cowles Foundation, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 1542.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2005
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Games and Economic Behavior (2007), 60: 104-134
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1542

Note: CFP 1237.
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Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA

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Related research
Keywords: Bayesian games; Communication; Communication equilibrium; Sequential communication equilibrium;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-9.


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