AbstractPrivacy and trust a ect our strategic thinking, yet they have not been precisely modeled in mechanism design. In settings of incomplete information, traditional implementations of a normal-form mechanism - by disregarding the players' privacy, or assuming trust in a mediator - may fail to reach the mechanism's objectives. We thus investigate implementations of a new type. We put forward the notion of a perfect implementation of a normal-form mechanism M: in essence, a concrete extensive-form mechanism exactly preserving all strategic properties of M, without relying on a trusted mediator or violating the privacy of the players. We prove that any normal-form mechanism can be perfectly implemented by a verifiable mediator using envelopes and an envelope-randomizing device (i.e., the same tools used for running fair lotteries or tallying secret votes). Differently from a trusted mediator, a veri able one only performs prescribed public actions, so that everyone can verify that he is acting properly, and that he never learns any information that should remain private
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR) in its series Working Papers with number w0140.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2010
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: 117418 Russia, Moscow, Nakhimovsky pr., 47, office 720
Phone: +7 (495) 105 50 02
Fax: +7 (495) 105 50 03
Web page: http://www.cefir.ru
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- NEP-ALL-2010-04-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2010-04-17 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2010-04-17 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Amparo Urbano & Jose E. Vila, 2002. "Computational Complexity and Communication: Coordination in Two-Player Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 1893-1927, September.
- Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2002.
"Long Cheap Talk,"
Discussion Paper Series
dp284, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, revised Nov 2002.
- Rothkopf, Michael H & Teisberg, Thomas J & Kahn, Edward P, 1990. "Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(1), pages 94-109, February.
- Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 2003. "Cheap talk in games with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 45-71, January.
- Forges, Francoise M, 1986.
"An Approach to Communication Equilibria,"
Econometric Society, vol. 54(6), pages 1375-85, November.
- Patrick Bolton & Mathias Dewatripont, 2005.
MIT Press Books,
The MIT Press,
edition 1, volume 1, number 0262025760.
- Dino Gerardi, 2002.
"Unmediated Communication in Games with Complete and Incomplete Information,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1371, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Gerardi, Dino, 2004. "Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 104-131, January.
- Gerardi, Dino & Myerson, Roger B., 2007.
"Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 104-134, July.
- Dino Gerardi & Roger B. Myerson, 2005. "Sequential Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Communication," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1542, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Forges, Francoise, 1990.
Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1341-64, November.
- Eric Maskin & Tomas Sjostrom, 2001.
Economics Working Papers
0006, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Vijay Krishna, R., 2007. "Communication in games of incomplete information: Two players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 584-592, January.
- Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 1998. "Correlation without Mediation: Expanding the Set of Equilibrium Outcomes by "Cheap" Pre-play Procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 108-122, May.
- Péter Vida & Francoise Forges, 2011.
"Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk: The Two-Player Case,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
3360, CESifo Group Munich.
- Forges, Françoise & Vida, Péter, 2013. "Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
- Forges, Françoise & Vida, Péter, 2013. "Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk : the Two-Player Case," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/8159, Paris Dauphine University.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Julia Babich).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.