Correlation without Mediation: Expanding the Set of Equilibrium Outcomes by "Cheap" Pre-play Procedures
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 80 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
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