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Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol

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  • Heller, Yuval

Abstract

This paper analyzes the implementation of correlated equilibria that are immune to joint deviations of coalitions by cheap-talk protocols. We construct a cheap-talk protocol that is resistant to deviations of fewer than half the players, and using it, we show that a large set of correlated equilibria can be implemented as Nash equilibria in the extended game with cheap-talk. Furthermore, we demonstrate that in general there is no cheap-talk protocol that is resistant for deviations of half the players.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 69 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (July)
Pages: 394-400

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:69:y:2010:i:2:p:394-400

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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Keywords: Non-cooperative games Cheap-talk Correlated equilibrium Strong equilibrium Coalition-proof equilibrium Fault-tolerant distributed computation;

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References

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  7. Eliaz, K., 1999. "Fault Tolerant Implementation," Papers, Tel Aviv 21-99, Tel Aviv.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Heller, Yuval & Solan, Eilon & Tomala, Tristan, 2012. "Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 222-234.
  2. Heller, Yuval, 2010. "All-stage strong correlated equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 184-188, May.
  3. Vida, Péter & Azacis, Helmuts, 2012. "A Detail-Free Mediator," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2012/10, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.

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