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Coalition-Proofness and Correlation with Arbitrary Communication Possibilities

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Milgrom, Paul
Roberts, John

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 17 (1996)
Issue (Month): 1 (November)
Pages: 113-128
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:17:y:1996:i:1:p:113-128

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  2. Ilya Segal, 1998. "Contracting with Externalities," Public Economics 9802002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  3. Takuya Masuzawa, 2008. "Computing the cores of strategic games with punishment–dominance relations," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 185-201, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Yi-Chun Chen & Ngo Van Long & Xiao Luo, 2007. "Iterated Strict Dominance in General Games," CIRANO Working Papers 2007s-03, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Sandeep Baliga & Stephen Morris, 2000. "Coordination, Spillovers, and Cheap Talk," Discussion Papers 1301, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Anthony Fai-Tong Chung, 2004. "Coalition-Stable Equilibria in Repeated Games," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 581, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  7. Forges, Françoise, 2009. "Correlated equilibrium and communication in games," Open Access publications from Université Paris-Dauphine urn:hdl:123456789/171, Université Paris-Dauphine. [Downloadable!]
  8. Rick Harbaugh & Ted To, 2008. "Opportunistic Discrimination," Working Papers 2008-07, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
  9. Bloch, Francis & Dutta, Bhaskar, 2006. "Correlated Equilibria, Incomplete Information and Coalitional Deviations," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 763, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Heller, Yuval, 2008. "All-stage strong correlated equilibrium," MPRA Paper 7717, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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