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Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information

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  • Heller, Yuval
  • Solan, Eilon
  • Tomala, Tristan

Abstract

This paper studies extensive form games with perfect information and simultaneous moves, henceforth called games with public information. On this class, we prove that all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained without mediator by cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated games and stochastic games.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25895/
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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/54905/
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 25895.

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Date of creation: 01 Jun 2010
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:25895

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Keywords: correlated equilbirium; distributed computation;

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References

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  1. Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, 1996. "Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 103-118, Summer.
  2. AUMANN, Robert J., . "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," CORE Discussion Papers RP, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -167, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Myerson, Roger B, 1986. "Multistage Games with Communication," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 323-58, March.
  4. FORGES, Françoise, . "Universal mechanisms," CORE Discussion Papers RP, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -914, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Heller, Yuval, 2010. "Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 394-400, July.
  6. Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2004. "Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/6103, Paris Dauphine University.
  7. Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 2003. "Cheap talk in games with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 45-71, January.
  8. Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2002. "Correlated Equilibrium in Stochastic Games," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/6019, Paris Dauphine University.
  9. F. Forges, 2010. "An Approach to Communication Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 516, David K. Levine.
  10. Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2002. "Correlated Equilibrium in Stochastic Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 362-399, February.
  11. Dino Gerardi, 2002. "Unmediated Communication in Games with Complete and Incomplete Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1371, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  12. Dubey, Pradeep & Kaneko, Mamoru, 1985. "Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games -- II," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 247-262, December.
  13. Amparo Urbano & Jose E. Vila, 2002. "Computational Complexity and Communication: Coordination in Two-Player Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 1893-1927, September.
  14. V. Crawford & J. Sobel, 2010. "Strategic Information Transmission," Levine's Working Paper Archive 544, David K. Levine.
  15. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, December.
  16. Pradeep Dubey & Mamoru Kaneko, 1983. "Information Patterns and Nash Equilibria in Extensive Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 676, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  17. Eilon Solan, 2001. "Characterization of correlated equilibria in stochastic games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 259-277.
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Cited by:
  1. Péter Vida & Francoise Forges, 2011. "Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk: The Two-Player Case," CESifo Working Paper Series 3360, CESifo Group Munich.

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