Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Correlated equilibrium as a stable standard of behavior

Contents:

Author Info

  • Indrajit Ray

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University of York, Heslington, York YO1 5DD, UK)

Abstract

We study the concept of correlated equilibrium within the framework of social situations (Greenberg 1990) and find that the unique optimistic stable standard of behavior (OSSB) of an appropriately defined correlated situation is nothing but the set of correlated equilibria. We generalize this situation in a natural way to accommodate coalitional deviations, and define the strong correlated situation. As the unique OSSB of this new situation, we derive a strong refinement of the set of correlated equilibria which we call strong correlated equilibrium. We analyse our concept and compare it with other existing notions using several examples.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10058/papers/8003003/80030257.pdf
Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Review of Economic Design.

Volume (Year): 3 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 257-269

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:3:p:257-269

Note: Received: 23 May 1996 / Accepted: 6 October 1997
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10058/index.htm

Order Information:
Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm

Related research

Keywords:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Heller, Yuval, 2010. "All-stage strong correlated equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 184-188, May.
  2. Heller, Yuval, 2005. "A minority-proof cheap-talk protocol," MPRA Paper 7716, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 Feb 2008.
  3. Sheng-Chieh Huang & Xiao Luo, 2008. "Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 309-329, February.
  4. Xiao Luo, 2009. "On the foundation of stability," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 185-201, August.
  5. Francis Bloch & Bhaskar Dutta, 2006. "Correlated Equilibria, Incomplete Information and Coalitional Deviations," Working Papers halshs-00410457, HAL.
  6. Nicholas Ziros, 2011. "Negotiation-proof correlated equilibrium," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 14-2011, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
  7. Jobst Heitzig & Forest Simmons, 2012. "Some chance for consensus: voting methods for which consensus is an equilibrium," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 43-57, January.
  8. Heller, Yuval, 2008. "Ex-ante and ex-post strong correlated equilbrium," MPRA Paper 7717, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 11 Mar 2008.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:3:p:257-269. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.