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Correlated equilibrium as a stable standard of behavior

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Author Info
Indrajit Ray () (Department of Economics, University of York, Heslington, York YO1 5DD, UK)

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Abstract

We study the concept of correlated equilibrium within the framework of social situations (Greenberg 1990) and find that the unique optimistic stable standard of behavior (OSSB) of an appropriately defined correlated situation is nothing but the set of correlated equilibria. We generalize this situation in a natural way to accommodate coalitional deviations, and define the strong correlated situation. As the unique OSSB of this new situation, we derive a strong refinement of the set of correlated equilibria which we call strong correlated equilibrium. We analyse our concept and compare it with other existing notions using several examples.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Review of Economic Design.

Volume (Year): 3 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 257-269
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Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:3:p:257-269

Note: Received: 23 May 1996 / Accepted: 6 October 1997
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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  1. Sheng-Chieh Huang & Xiao Luo, 2008. "Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 309-329, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Heller, Yuval, 2008. "All-stage strong correlated equilibrium," MPRA Paper 7717, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  3. Xiao Luo, 2009. "On the foundation of stability," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 185-201, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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