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Negotiation-proof correlated equilibrium

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  • Nicholas Ziros
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    Abstract

    This article characterizes the set of correlated equilibria that result from open negotiations, which players make prior to playing a strategic game. A negotiation-proof correlated equilibrium is defined as a correlated strategy in which the negotiation process among all of the players prevents the formation of any improving coalitional deviation. Additionally, this notion of equilibrium is adapted to general games with incomplete information.

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    File URL: http://papers.econ.ucy.ac.cy/RePEc/papers/14-2011.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University of Cyprus Department of Economics in its series University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics with number 14-2011.

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    Length: 17 pages
    Date of creation: Dec 2011
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ucy:cypeua:14-2011

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    Web page: http://www.econ.ucy.ac.cy

    Related research

    Keywords: Correlated equilibrium; coalitions; negotiation; incomplete information;

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    1. Robert J. Aumann, 2010. "Correlated Equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian Rationality," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000377, David K. Levine.
    2. Indrajit Ray, 1998. "Correlated equilibrium as a stable standard of behavior," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 257-269.
    3. Licun Xue, 2000. "Negotiation-proof Nash equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 339-357.
    4. F. Forges, 2010. "An Approach to Communication Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 516, David K. Levine.
    5. R. Aumann, 2010. "Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies," Levine's Working Paper Archive 389, David K. Levine.
    6. Greenberg, Joseph, 1989. "Deriving strong and coalition-proof nash equilibria from an abstract system," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 195-202, October.
    7. Moreno, Diego & Wooders, John, 1996. "Coalition-Proof Equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 80-112, November.
    8. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
    9. Heller, Yuval, 2010. "All-stage strong correlated equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 184-188, May.
    10. Licun Xue, 1998. "Coalitional stability under perfect foresight," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 603-627.
    11. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria II. Applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 13-29, June.
    12. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1996. "Coalition-Proofness and Correlation with Arbitrary Communication Possibilities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 113-128, November.
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