Negotiation-proof correlated equilibrium
AbstractThis article characterizes the set of correlated equilibria that result from open negotiations, which players make prior to playing a strategic game. A negotiation-proof correlated equilibrium is defined as a correlated strategy in which the negotiation process among all of the players prevents the formation of any improving coalitional deviation. Additionally, this notion of equilibrium is adapted to general games with incomplete information.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Cyprus Department of Economics in its series University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics with number 14-2011.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2011
Date of revision:
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Web page: http://www.econ.ucy.ac.cy
Correlated equilibrium; coalitions; negotiation; incomplete information;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-12-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2011-12-19 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2011-12-19 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2011-12-19 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2011-12-19 (Microeconomics)
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