Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Ex-ante and ex-post strong correlated equilbrium

Contents:

Author Info

  • Heller, Yuval

Abstract

A strong correlated equilibrium is a strategy profile that is immune to joint deviations. Different notions of strong correlated equilibria were defined in the literature. One major difference among those definitions is the stage in which coalitions can plan a joint deviation: before (ex-ante) or after (ex-post) the deviating players receive their part of the correlated profile. In this paper we prove that if deviating coalitions are allowed to use new correlating devices, then an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium is also immune to deviations at the ex-post stage. Thus the set of ex-ante strong correlated equilibria of Moreno & Wooders (1996) is included in all other sets of strong correlated equilibria.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7717/
File Function: original version
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7903/
File Function: revised version
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/54904/
File Function: revised version
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8141/
File Function: revised version
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8294/
File Function: revised version
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8505/
File Function: revised version
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8784/
File Function: revised version
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9280/
File Function: revised version
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15644/
File Function: revised version
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 7717.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 11 Mar 2008
Date of revision: 11 Mar 2008
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:7717

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: correlated equilibrium; strong equilbrium; coaliton-proof equilbrium; ex-ante; ex-post; common knowledge;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
  2. RAY , Indrajit, 1993. "Coalition-Proof Correlated Equilibrium : A Definition," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 1993053, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Licun Xue, 1998. "Coalitional stability under perfect foresight," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 603-627.
  4. Farrell, Joseph & Saloner, Garth, 1988. "Coordination Through Committees and Markets," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley qt08w115vq, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  5. Bloch, Francis & Dutta, Bhaskar, 2006. "Correlated Equilibria, Incomplete Information and Coalitional Deviations," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics 763, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  6. Konishi, Hideo & Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 1999. "On Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria in Common Agency Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 122-139, March.
  7. Le Breton, M. & Konishi, H. & Weber, S., 1995. "Equivalence of Strong and Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria in Games without Spillovers," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III 95a39, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
  8. Sylvie Thoron, 1998. "Formation of a Coalition-Proof Stable Cartel," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(1), pages 63-76, February.
  9. Greenberg, Joseph, 1989. "Deriving strong and coalition-proof nash equilibria from an abstract system," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 195-202, October.
  10. Konishi, Hideo & Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 1997. "Equilibria in a Model with Partial Rivalry," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 225-237, January.
  11. Indrajit Ray, 1998. "Correlated equilibrium as a stable standard of behavior," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 257-269.
  12. Moreno, Diego & Wooders, John, 1998. "An Experimental Study of Communication and Coordination in Noncooperative Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 47-76, July.
  13. Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2002. "Long Cheap Talk," Discussion Paper Series, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem dp284, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, revised Nov 2002.
  14. Licun Xue, 2000. "Negotiation-proof Nash equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 339-357.
  15. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1996. "Coalition-Proofness and Correlation with Arbitrary Communication Possibilities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 113-128, November.
  16. Delgado, Juan & Moreno, Diego, 2004. "Coalition-proof supply function equilibria in oligopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 114(2), pages 231-254, February.
  17. R. Aumann, 2010. "Correlated Equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian Rationality," Levine's Bibliography 513, UCLA Department of Economics.
  18. Moreno, Diego & Wooders, John, 1996. "Coalition-Proof Equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 80-112, November.
  19. Yi, Sang-Seung, 1999. "On the Coalition-Proofness of the Pareto Frontier of the Set of Nash Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 353-364, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:7717. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.