Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies

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Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies

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GIRAUD, Ga‘l
ROCHON, CŽline

Abstract

We present a feasible strategic market mechanism with finitely many agents whose Nash, semi-strong Nash and coalition-proof Nash equilibria fully implement the Walrasian equilibria. We define a strategic equilibrium concept, called correlated semi-strong equilibrium, and show that the Walrasian equilibria can be implemented by the these equilibria, and also by the coalition-proof correlated equilibria of our mechanism. We show that these two concepts, suitably modified with transfers, fully implement the Pareto optimal allocations. We extend to semi-strong correlated equilibria Aumann's Bayesian interpretation of correlated equilibria.

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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2001018.

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Date of creation: 01 Apr 2001
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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2001018

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies

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BOCHET, Olivier, 2005. "Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem," CORE Discussion Papers 2005060, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Bochet,Olivier, 2005. "Implementation of the Walrasian Correspondence: The Boundary Problem," Research Memoranda 037, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
- Olivier Bochet, 2007. "Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 301-316, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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