Generic efficiency and collusion-proofness in exchange economies
AbstractThe purpose of this paper is to study the kind of efficient allocations that can be achieved in exchange economies with asymmetric information, by means of a decentralized mechanism robust to coalitional, strategic deviations. To this end, we define a new strategic equilibrium concept – called strong collusion-proof contract – designed to characterize stable communication agreements in games with differential information against non-binding, self-enforcing and incentive compatible deviations by coalitions. We then construct a strategic market mechanism which, for quasi-linear economies, is such that its strong collusion-proof contracts generically induce the incentive compatible interim efficient allocations. Moreover, we show that these allocations can be achieved by strong collusion-proof contracts. We show that the internally consistent extension of the strong collusion-proof contracts generically yields the same set of efficient allocations. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 20 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (06)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- GIRAUD, Gaël & ROCHON, Céline, 2001. "Generic efficiency and collusion-proofness in exchange economies," CORE Discussion Papers 2001019, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
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