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Allocations and manipulation in Kyoto type protocols

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  • Sudhir A. Shah

    (Delhi School of Economics)

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    Abstract

    We study an incomplete information, non-cooperative model of the determination of national emission endowments under a Kyoto type protocol with heterogeneous nations. The model generates a link between national types and equilibrium na-tional emission caps. We analyze this link to (a) derive the type-contingent ordering of emission allocations, (b) study the effects of growth on emission al-locations, and (c) study the strategies that nations can use to manipulate the emission allocation process. Synthesizing these results allows us to derive the implications of national heterogeneity and asymmetry of economic power in the capping process.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics in its series Working papers with number 125.

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    Length: 33 pages
    Date of creation: Apr 2004
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:cde:cdewps:125

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    Related research

    Keywords: correlated equilibrium; heterogeneity; incomplete information; Kyoto protocol; manipulation; non-cooperative game.;

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