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The Gamma-Core and Coalition Formation Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Parkash Chander
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This paper reinterprets the gamma-core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction that the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions can freely merge or break apart, are farsighted (that is, it is the final and not the immediate payoffs that matter to the coalitions) and a coalition may deviate if and only if it stands to gain from it. It is then shown that subsequent to a deviation by a coalition, the nonmembers will have incentives to break apart into singletons, as is assumed in the definition of the gamma-characteristic function, and that the grand coalition is the only stable coalition structure.
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Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings with number
108.
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Date of creation: 11 Aug 2004Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ecm:nasm04:108Contact details of provider: Phone: 1 212 998 3820 Fax: 1 212 995 4487 Email: Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/pastmeetings.asp More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: strategic games ; coalition formation ; farsighted ; core ; characteristic function ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
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Rabia Nessah & Kristiaan Kerstens, 2008.
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