The gamma-core and coalition formation

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The gamma-core and coalition formation

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Parkash Chander ()

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Parkash Chander

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Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 35 (2007)
Issue (Month): 4 (April)
Pages: 539-556
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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:35:y:2007:i:4:p:539-556

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Paper
- Parkash Chander, 2004. "The Gamma-Core and Coalition Formation," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 108, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Roberts, Donald John, 1974. "The Lindahl solution for economies with public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 23-42, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1999. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 286-336, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Ray, D. & Vohra, R., 1996. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structure," Papers 68, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 1996. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structure," Papers 0068, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 1998. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures," Working Papers 98-1, Brown University, Department of Economics, revised Jan 1998.
Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-94, Supplemen. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Scarf, Herbert E., 1971. "On the existence of a coopertive solution for a general class of N-person games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 169-181, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Herbert E. Scarf, 1970. "On the Existence of a Cooperative Solution for a General Class of N-Person Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 293, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-64, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Chwe Michael Suk-Young, 1994. "Farsighted Coalitional Stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 299-325, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Chander, P., 1998. "International Treaties on Global Pollution: a Dynamic Time-Path Analysis," Papers 9854, Catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics.
Other versions:
- Parkash Chander, 1998. "International Treaties on Global Pollution: A Dynamic Time-Path Analysis," Economics Working Paper Archive 400, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
Carsten Helm, 2001. "On the existence of a cooperative solution for a coalitional game with externalities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 141-146. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 1994. "A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution," Working Papers 897, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
Henry Tulkens & Parkash Chander, 1997. "The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 379-401.
Other versions:
- Chandler, P. & Tulkens, H., 1995. "The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities," Papers 9550, Catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics.
- Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 1994. "The Core of an Economy With Multilateral Environmental Externalities," Working Papers 886, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
Licun Xue, 1998. "Coalitional stability under perfect foresight," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 603-627. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Chander, Parkash, 1993. "Dynamic Procedures and Incentives in Public Good Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1341-54, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1991. "Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment," CEPR Discussion Papers 568, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1997. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 30-78, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Ray, D. & Vohra, R., 1993. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Papers 21, Boston University - Department of Economics.
Moulin, Herve, 1987. "Egalitarian-Equivalent Cost Sharing of a Public Good," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(4), pages 963-76, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Licun Xue, . "Coalitions, Agreements and Efficiency," Economics Working Papers 2002-9, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Licun Xue, 2002. "Coalitions, Agreements and Efficiency," Grand Coalition 28, Grand Coalition Web Site. [Downloadable!]
- Diamantoudi, Effrosyni & Xue, Licun, 2007. "Coalitions, agreements and efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 105-125, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Foley, Duncan K, 1970. "Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 38(1), pages 66-72, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Yi, Sang-Seung, 1997. "Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 201-237, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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