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Cooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion

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Author Info
Henry Tulkens (Center for operations research and econometrics (CORE))
Parkash Chander (National University of Singapore)

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Abstract

In essence, any international environmental agreement (IEA) implies cooperation of a form or another. The paper seeks for logical foundations of this. It first deals with how the need for cooperation derives from the public good aspect of the externalities involved, as well as with where the source of cooperation lies in cooperative game theory. In either case, the quest for efficiency is claimed to be at the root of cooperation. Next, cooperation is considered from the point of view of stability. After recalling the two competing concepts of stability in use in the IEA literature, new insights on the nature of the gamma core in general are given as well as of the Chander-Tulkens solution within the gamma core. Free riding is also evaluated in relation with the alternative forms of stability under scrutiny. Finally, it is asked whether with the often mentioned virtue of “self enforcement” any conceptual gain is achieved, different from what is meant by efficiency and stability. A skeptical answer is offered, as a reply to Barrett’s (2003) attempt at giving the notion a specific content.

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Paper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2006.34.

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Date of creation: Feb 2006
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Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2006.34

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Related research
Keywords: International Environmental Agreements; Cooperation; Stability; Self-enforcement;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Tulkens, Henry & Schoumaker, Francoise, 1975. "Stability analysis of an effluent charge and the `polluters pay' principle," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 245-269, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-94, Supplemen. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Dreze, Jacques H & de la Vallee Poussin, D, 1971. "A Tatonnement Process for Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(114), pages 133-50, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2007. "Measures to enhance the success of global climate treaties," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 73-97, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Buonanno, Paolo & Carraro, Carlo & Galeotti, Marzio, 2003. "Endogenous induced technical change and the costs of Kyoto," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 11-34, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Carlo Carraro & Barbara Buchner, 2005. "Regional and Sub-Global Climate Blocs.A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Bottom-up Climate Regimes," Working Papers 2005.21, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 1994. "A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution," Working Papers 897, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Henry Tulkens & Parkash Chander, 1997. "The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 379-401.
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  9. Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry & Ypersele, Jean-Pascal van & Willems, Stephane, 1999. "The Kyoto Protocol: An Economic and Game Theoretic Interpretation," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Oran R. Young, 2003. "Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making," Global Environmental Politics, MIT Press, vol. 3(1), pages 145-147, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Roberts, John, 1979. "Incentives in Planning Procedures for the Provision of Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 46(2), pages 283-92, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. VAN STEENBERGHE, Vincent, 2004. "Core-stable and equitable allocations of greenhouse gas emission permits," CORE Discussion Papers 2004075, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
  13. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Champsaur, Paul & Laroque, Guy, 1982. "Strategic Behavior in Decentralized Planning Procedures," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(2), pages 325-44, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Dritan Osmani & Richard S.J. Tol, 2008. "Evolution in time of Farsightedly Stable Coalitions: An Application of FUND," Working Papers FNU-162, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised May 2008. [Downloadable!]
  2. Thierry Bréchet & François Gerard, 2007. "Climate Coalitions: A Theoretical and Computational Appraisal," Working Papers 2007.21, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  3. Thierry, BRECHET & Franois, GERARD & Henry, TULKENS, 2007. "Climate coalitions : a theoretical and computational appraisal," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2007006, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Dritan Osmani & Richard S.J. Tol, 2007. "A short note on joint welfare maximization assumptions," Working Papers FNU-150, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised Oct 2007. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Dritan Osmani & Richard S.J. Tol, 2007. "Toward Farsightedly Stable International Environmental Agreements, Part two," Working Papers FNU-149, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised Oct 2007. [Downloadable!]
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