Cooperation, stability and self-enforcement in interational environmental agreements : a conceptual discussion

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Cooperation, stability and self-enforcement in interational environmental agreements : a conceptual discussion

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Henry, TULKENS (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Department of Economics)
Parkash, CHANDER (National University of Singapore)

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Abstract

In essence, any international environmental agreement (IEA) imples cooperation of a form or another; The paper seeks for logical foundations of this. It first deals with how the need for cooperation derives from the public good aspect of the externalities involved, as well as with where the source of cooperation lies in cooperative game theory. In either case, the quest for efficiency is claimed to be at the root of cooperation. Next, cooperation is considered from the point of view of stability. After recalling the two competing concepts of stability in use in the IEA literature, new insights on the nature of the gamma core in general are given as well as of the Chandler-Tulkens solution within the gamma core. Free riding is also evaluated in relation with the alternative forms of stability under scrutiny. Finally, it is asked whether with the often mentioned virtue of Òself enforcementÓ any conceptual gain is achieved, different from what is meant by efficiency and stability. A skeptical answer is offered, as a reply to BarretÕs (2003) attempt at giving the notion a specific content.

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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques in its series Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) with number 2006003.

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Length: 26
Date of creation: 15 Jan 2006
Date of revision: 15 Jan 2006
Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvec:2006003

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Paper
- Henry Tulkens & Parkash Chander, 2006. "Cooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion," Working Papers 2006.34, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
- CHANDER, Parkash & TULKENS, Henry, 2006. "Cooperation, stability and self-enforcement in international environmental agreements: a conceptual discussion," CORE Discussion Papers 2006003, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
- Parkash CHANDER & Henry TULKENS, 2006. "Cooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion," SCAPE Policy Research Working Paper Series 0609, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics, SCAPE. [Downloadable!]
- Parkash Chander & Henry Tulkens, 2009. "Cooperation, Stability And Self- Enforcement In International Environmental Agreements- A Conceptual Discussion," Microeconomics Working Papers 1654, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2006-03-25 (All new papers)
NEP-ENV-2006-03-25 (Environmental Economics)
NEP-POL-2006-03-25 (Positive Political Economics)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Tulkens, Henry & Schoumaker, Francoise, 1975. "Stability analysis of an effluent charge and the `polluters pay' principle," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 245-269, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Carlo Carraro & Barbara Buchner, 2005. "Regional and Sub-Global Climate Blocs.A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Bottom-up Climate Regimes," Working Papers 2005.21, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
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- Carlo Carraro & Barbara Buchner, 2006. "Regional and sub-global climate blocs. A game-theoretic perspective on bottom-up climate regimes," Working Papers 2006_10, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Buchner, Barbara & Carraro, Carlo, 2005. "Regional and Sub-Global Climate Blocs. A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Bottom-up Climate Regimes," CEPR Discussion Papers 5034, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 1994. "A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution," Working Papers 897, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- CHANDERÊ, Parkash & TULKENS, Henry, 1994. "A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution," CORE Discussion Papers 1994048, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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Henry Tulkens & Parkash Chander, 1997. "The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 379-401.
Other versions:
- Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 1994. "The Core of an Economy With Multilateral Environmental Externalities," Working Papers 886, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry & Ypersele, Jean-Pascal van & Willems, Stephane, 1999. "The Kyoto Protocol: An Economic and Game Theoretic Interpretation," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- CHANDER, Parkash & TULKENS, Henry & VAN YPERSELE, Jean-Pascal & WILLEMS, Stefane, 1999. "The Kyoto protocol: an economic and game theoretic interpretation," CORE Discussion Papers 1999025, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
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Roberts, John, 1979. "Incentives in Planning Procedures for the Provision of Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 46(2), pages 283-92, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
VAN STEENBERGHE, Vincent, 2004. "Core-stable and equitable allocations of greenhouse gas emission permits," CORE Discussion Papers 2004075, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1991. "Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment," CEPR Discussion Papers 568, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Champsaur, Paul & Laroque, Guy, 1982. "Strategic Behavior in Decentralized Planning Procedures," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(2), pages 325-44, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Full references

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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Thierry, BRECHET & Franois, GERARD & Henry, TULKENS, 2007. "Climate coalitions : a theoretical and computational appraisal," Discussion Papers (ECON - DÃ©partement des Sciences Economiques) 2007006, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- BRECHET, Thierry & GERARD, Franois & TULKENS, Henry, 2007. "Climate coalitions: a theoretical and computational appraisal," CORE Discussion Papers 2007003, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
Dritan Osmani & Richard S.J. Tol, 2007. "Toward Farsightedly Stable International Environmental Agreements, Part two," Working Papers FNU-149, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised Oct 2007. [Downloadable!]
Dritan Osmani & Richard S.J. Tol, 2008. "Evolution in time of Farsightedly Stable Coalitions: An Application of FUND," Working Papers FNU-162, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised May 2008. [Downloadable!]
Thierry Bréchet & François Gerard, 2007. "Climate Coalitions: A Theoretical and Computational Appraisal," Working Papers 2007.21, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
Dritan Osmani & Richard S.J. Tol, 2007. "A short note on joint welfare maximization assumptions," Working Papers FNU-150, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised Oct 2007. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Dritan Osmani & Richard S J Tol, 2008. "A Short Note on Joint Welfare Maximization Assumption," Icfai University Journal of Managerial Economics, Icfai Press, vol. 0(3), pages 22-39, August.

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