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Cooperation, stability and self-enforcement in international environmental agreements: a conceptual discussion Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics CHANDER, Parkash
TULKENS, Henry
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In essence, any international environmental agreement (IEA) implies cooperation of a form or another. The paper seeks for logical foundations of this. It Þrst deals with how the need for cooperation derives from the public good aspect of the externalities involved, as well as with where the source of cooperation lies in cooperative game theory. In either case, the quest for efficiency is claimed to be at the root of cooperation. Competing concepts of stability in use in the IEA literature, new insights on the nature of the gamma core in general are given as well as the Chander-Tulkens solution within the gamma core. Free riding is also evaluated in relation with the alternative forms of stability under scrutiny. Finally, it is asked whether with the often mentioned virtue of Òself enforcementÓ any conceptual gain is achieved, different from what is meant by efficiency and stability. A skeptical answer is o?ered, as a reply to BarrettÕs (2003) attempt at giving the notion a speciÞc content.
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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number
2006003.
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Date of creation: 01 Feb 2006Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2006003Contact details of provider: Postal: Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium) Phone: 32(10)474321 Fax: +32 10474301 Email: Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/core More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: Other versions of this item:
Paper Henry Tulkens & Parkash Chander, 2006.
"Cooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion ,"
Working Papers
2006.34, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
[Downloadable!] Parkash CHANDER & Henry TULKENS, 2006.
"Cooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion ,"
SCAPE Policy Research Working Paper Series
0609, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics, SCAPE.
[Downloadable!] Parkash Chander & Henry Tulkens, 2009.
"Cooperation, Stability And Self- Enforcement In International Environmental Agreements- A Conceptual Discussion ,"
Microeconomics Working Papers
1654, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
[Downloadable!] Henry, TULKENS & Parkash, CHANDER, 2006.
"Cooperation, stability and self-enforcement in interational environmental agreements : a conceptual discussion ,"
Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques)
2006003, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques, revised 15 Jan 2006.
[Downloadable!] References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Tulkens, Henry & Schoumaker, Francoise, 1975.
"Stability analysis of an effluent charge and the `polluters pay' principle ,"
Journal of Public Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 245-269, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Barrett, Scott, 1994.
"Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements ,"
Oxford Economic Papers ,
Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-94, Supplemen.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Dreze, Jacques H & de la Vallee Poussin, D, 1971.
"A Tatonnement Process for Public Goods ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(114), pages 133-50, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2007.
"Measures to enhance the success of global climate treaties ,"
International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics ,
Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 73-97, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Buonanno, Paolo & Carraro, Carlo & Galeotti, Marzio, 2003.
"Endogenous induced technical change and the costs of Kyoto ,"
Resource and Energy Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 11-34, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Carlo Carraro & Barbara Buchner, 2005.
"Regional and Sub-Global Climate Blocs.A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Bottom-up Climate Regimes ,"
Working Papers
2005.21, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 1994.
"A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution ,"
Working Papers
897, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
CHANDERÊ, Parkash & TULKENS, Henry, 1994.
"A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution ,"
CORE Discussion Papers
1994048, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
Parkash Chander & Henry Tulkens, 1995.
"A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution ,"
International Tax and Public Finance ,
Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 279-293, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Henry Tulkens & Parkash Chander, 1997.
"The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities ,"
International Journal of Game Theory ,
Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 379-401.
Other versions: Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry & Ypersele, Jean-Pascal van & Willems, Stephane, 1999.
"The Kyoto Protocol: An Economic and Game Theoretic Interpretation ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Oran R. Young, 2003.
"Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making ,"
Global Environmental Politics ,
MIT Press, vol. 3(1), pages 145-147, 02.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Roberts, John, 1979.
"Incentives in Planning Procedures for the Provision of Public Goods ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 46(2), pages 283-92, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
VAN STEENBERGHE, Vincent, 2004.
"Core-stable and equitable allocations of greenhouse gas emission permits ,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2004075, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
[Downloadable!]
Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993.
"Strategies for the international protection of the environment ,"
Journal of Public Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Champsaur, Paul & Laroque, Guy, 1982.
"Strategic Behavior in Decentralized Planning Procedures ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 50(2), pages 325-44, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Thierry Bréchet & François Gerard, 2007.
"Climate Coalitions: A Theoretical and Computational Appraisal ,"
Working Papers
2007.21, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
[Downloadable!]
Dritan Osmani & Richard S.J. Tol, 2007.
"A short note on joint welfare maximization assumptions ,"
Working Papers
FNU-150, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised Oct 2007.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Thierry, BRECHET & Franois, GERARD & Henry, TULKENS, 2007.
"Climate coalitions : a theoretical and computational appraisal ,"
Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques)
2007006, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Dritan Osmani & Richard S.J. Tol, 2007.
"Toward Farsightedly Stable International Environmental Agreements, Part two ,"
Working Papers
FNU-149, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised Oct 2007.
[Downloadable!]
Dritan Osmani & Richard S.J. Tol, 2008.
"Evolution in time of Farsightedly Stable Coalitions: An Application of FUND ,"
Working Papers
FNU-162, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised May 2008.
[Downloadable!]
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