Strategies for the international protection of the environment
AbstractThis paper provides a general framework for studying the profitability and stability of international agreements to protect the environment in the presence of trans-frontier or global pollution. N countries are assumed to bargain on emission control. Each country decides whether or not to coordinate its strategy with other countries. A coalition is formed when both profitability and stability (no free riding) conditions are satisfied. The analysis shows that such coalitions exist but that only a small number of countries decide to cooperate. The paper thus explores the possibility of expanding such coalitions through transfers that induce other countries to cooperate. It is shown that large stable coalitions exist when low environmental interdependence exists and/or when the environmental damage functions are near-separable with respect to domestic and imported emissions. It is also shown that there are cases in which environmental negotiations can achieve substantial emission control even if countries behave non-cooperatively.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.
Volume (Year): 52 (1993)
Issue (Month): 3 (October)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578
Other versions of this item:
- Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1991. "Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment," CEPR Discussion Papers 568, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
You can help add them by filling out this form.
RePEc Biblio mentionsAs found on the RePEc Biblio, the curated bibliography for Economics:
- > Environmental and Natural Resource Economics > Climate economics
- > Environmental and Natural Resource Economics > Climate economics > International agreements
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading lists or Wikipedia pages:
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.