This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

A Non-Cooperative Theory Of Quantity-Rationing International Transfrontier Pollution

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Sudhir A. Shah (Delhi School of Economics)
Abstract

We study the problem caused by international transfrontier pollution. Our re-sults are derived from the analysis of an incomplete information, non-cooperative game model of the determination of emissions in a quantity-rationing setting. We model the emission capping negotiations using the best response dynamic pro-cess and provide natural conditions under which the process has a unique and globally asymptotically stable stationary point. We then analyze the link be-tween type profiles and the stationary points of the negotiation process to derive various comparative statics results and the type-contingent ordering of emission allocations. Finally, we study the investment strategies that nations can use prior to the negotiations in order to manipulate the equilibrium emission caps. The results have implications regarding the political economy of emission capping.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.cdedse.org/pdf/work143.pdf
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics in its series Working papers with number 143.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cde:cdewps:143

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Delhi 110 007
Phone: (011) 27667005
Fax: (011) 27667159
Email:
Web page: http://www.cdedse.org/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://www.cdedse.org/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Vinayan. K.P).

Related research
Keywords: Emission capping; non-cooperative game; negotiations; incomplete information; manipulation;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
Q21 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Demand and Supply (the Commons)
Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
R11 - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Analysis of Growth, Development, and Changes

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Dockner Engelbert J. & Van Long Ngo, 1993. "International Pollution Control: Cooperative versus Noncooperative Strategies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 13-29, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-94, Supplemen. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-64, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Kolstad, Charles D., 1996. "Fundamental irreversibilities in stock externalities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 221-233, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Martin Wade E. & Patrick Robert H. & Tolwinski Boleslaw, 1993. "A Dynamic Game of a Transboundary Pollutant with Asymmetric Players," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 1-12, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 1994. "A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution," Working Papers 897, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Henry Tulkens & Parkash Chander, 1997. "The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 379-401.
    Other versions:
  8. Donsimoni, Marie-Paule & Economides, Nicholas S & Polemarchakis, Herakles M, 1986. "Stable Cartels," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(2), pages 317-27, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Hoel, Michael, 1993. "Intertemporal properties of an international carbon tax," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 51-70, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1997. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 30-78, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Petrosjan, Leon & Zaccour, Georges, 2003. "Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 381-398, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Van Der Ploeg, F. & De Zeeuw, A.J., 1990. "International Aspects Of Pollution Control," Papers 9065, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  15. Kelly, David L. & Kolstad, Charles D., 1999. "Bayesian learning, growth, and pollution," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 491-518, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Tahvonen Olli & Kaitala Veijo & Pohjola Matti, 1993. "A Finnish - Soviet Acid Rain Game: Noncooperative Equilibria, Cost Efficiency, and Sulfur Agreements," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 87-100, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 1992. "Theoretical foundations of negotiations and cost sharing in transfrontier pollution problems," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(2-3), pages 388-399, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by editing a NEP report.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-15.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.