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Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey

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Author Info
FORGES, Franoise
MINELLI, Enrico
VOHRA, Rajiv

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Abstract

This paper provides a general overview of the literature on the core of an exchange economy with asymetric information. Incentive compatibility is emphasized in studying core concepts at the ex ante and the interim stage.The analysis includes issues of non emptiness of the core as wellas core convergence to price equilibrium allocations.

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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2001043.

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Date of creation: 00 Sep 2001
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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2001043

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Related research
Keywords: core; asymmetric information; incentive; compatibility; exchange economy;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

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  7. Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the absence of wealth effects," Working Papers 2001-01, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra & Oscar Volij, 1999. "On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 99-22, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  16. Einy, Ezra & Moreno, Diego & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 2000. "On the Core of an Economy with Differential Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 262-270, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  19. Ichiishi, Tatsuro & Idzik, Adam, 1996. "Bayesian Cooperative Choice of Strategies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 455-73.
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  22. Forges, F. & Heifetz, A. & Minelli, E., 1999. "Incentive Compatible Core and Competitive Equilibria in Differential Information Economies," Papers 34-99, Tel Aviv.
    Other versions:
  23. Wilson, Robert B, 1978. "Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(4), pages 807-16, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  25. d'Aspremont, Claude & Cremer, Jacques & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1990. "Incentives and the existence of Pareto-optimal revelation mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 233-254, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  29. Cass, David & Shell, Karl, 1983. "Do Sunspots Matter?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(2), pages 193-227, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  31. Oscar Volij, 1998. "Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information," Economic theory and game theory 006, Oscar Volij, revised 15 Sep 1999. [Downloadable!]
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    Other versions:
  33. Bhaskar Dutta & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core," Working Papers 2001-02, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  34. Prescott, Edward C & Townsend, Robert M, 1984. "General Competitive Analysis in an Economy with Private Information," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 25(1), pages 1-20, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2005. "Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games," Working Papers 2005-01, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. João Correia-da-Silva & Carlos Hervés-Beloso, 2009. "Prudent expectations equilibrium in economies with uncertain delivery," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 67-92, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano, 2008. "Information transmission and core convergence in quasilinear economies," Working Papers 2008-01, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Francoise Forges, 2006. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in Exchange Economies with and without Indivisibilities," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  5. S. D. Flåm. & L. Koutsougeras, 2007. "Private information, transferable utility,and the core," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0703, Economics, The University of Manchester. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Bhaskar Dutta & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core," Working Papers 2001-02, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Ezra Einy & Ori Haimanko & Diego Moreno & Benyamin Shitovitz, 2003. "On The Continuity Of Equilibrium And Core Correspondences In Economies With Differential Information," Economics Working Papers we032707, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Vincent Anesi, 2007. "Information Aggregation in Spatial Committee Games," Discussion Papers 2007-03, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
  9. Khan, M. Ali Khan, 2007. "Perfect Competition," MPRA Paper 2202, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  10. Joao Correia-da-Silva & Carlos Herves-Beloso, 2008. "General equilibrium with private state verification," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000024, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the absence of wealth effects," Working Papers 2001-01, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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