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Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics McLean, Richard P.
Postlewaite, Andrew
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior .
Volume (Year): 45 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
Pages: 222-241
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:45:y:2003:i:1:p:222-241Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
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