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Core Convergence with Asymmetric Information

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Author Info
Richard McLean () (Department of Economics, Rutgers University)
Andrew Postlewaite () (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania)

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Abstract

We analyze the ex ante incentive compatible core for replicated private information economies. We show that any allocation in the core when the economy is replicated sufficiently often is approximately Walrasian for the associated Arrow-Debreu economy.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania in its series PIER Working Paper Archive with number 03-027.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 01 Nov 2003
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Handle: RePEc:pen:papers:03-027

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Related research
Keywords: Core Asymmetric Information Incentive Compatibility Exchange Economy

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, . "Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility," Penn CARESS Working Papers 7f6ff09d59945e06909ce4fa4, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Vohra, Rajiv, 1999. "Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility, and the Core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 123-147, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Einy, Ezra & Moreno, Diego & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 2000. "Rational expectations equilibria and the ex-post core of an economy with asymmetric information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 527-535, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. McLean, Richard P. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2003. "Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 222-241, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Forges, F. & Heifetz, A. & Minelli, E., 1999. "Incentive Compatible Core and Competitive Equilibria in Differential Information Economies," Papers 34-99, Tel Aviv.
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  6. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra & Oscar Volij, 2001. "On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(6), pages 1685-1696, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Sun, Yeneng & Zhang , Yongchao, 2008. "Individual Risk and Lebesgue Extension without Aggregate Uncertainty," MPRA Paper 7448, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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