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The Type-Agent Core for Exchange Economies with Asymmetric Information

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  • Geoffroy de Clippel

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File URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2004/2004-18_paper.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Brown University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2004-18.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2004-18

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Postal: Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912

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References

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  1. Volij, Oscar, 2000. "Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information," Staff General Research Papers 5140, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  2. Yves Balasko & David Cass & Karl Shell, 1990. "Market Participation and Sunspot Equilibria," Research Papers by the Institute of Economics and Econometrics, Geneva School of Economics and Management, University of Geneva 90.03, Institut d'Economie et Econométrie, Université de Genève.
  3. Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico & Vohra, Rajiv, 2002. "Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 1-41, September.
  4. Oscar Volij & Darin Lee, 1997. "The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information: An Axiomatic Approach," Game Theory and Information 9706002, EconWPA.
  5. Myerson Roger B., 1995. "Sustainable Matching Plans with Adverse Selection," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 35-65, April.
  6. Harsanyi, John C., 1994. "Games with Incomplete Information," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 1994-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
  7. Peraz-Castrillo, J., 1992. "Cooperative Outcomes Through Non-Cooperative Games," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 165.92, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  8. Rajiv Vohra & Roberto Serrano, 2004. "Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 519, Econometric Society.
  9. Herbert E. Scarf, 1965. "The Core of an N Person Game," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 182R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  10. Karl Shell & Aditya Goenka, 1997. "Robustness of sunspot equilibria," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 79-98.
  11. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra & Oscar Volij, 2000. "On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0141, Econometric Society.
  12. Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2003. "Core Convergence with Asymmetric Information," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-027, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  13. de CLIPPEL, Geoffroy & MINELLI, Enrico, 2002. "Two-person bargaining with verifiable information," CORE Discussion Papers 2002063, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  14. Perry, Motty & Reny, Philip J, 1994. "A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 795-817, July.
  15. Serrano Roberto, 1995. "A Market to Implement the Core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 285-294, October.
  16. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680, September.
  17. Wilson, Robert B, 1978. "Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(4), pages 807-16, July.
  18. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 1997. "Non-cooperative implementation of the core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 513-525.
  19. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
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Cited by:
  1. Françoise Forges & Roberto Serrano, 2013. "Cooperative Games With Incomplete Information: Some Open Problems," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 15(02), pages 1340009-1-1.
  2. Okada, Akira, 2012. "Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 1165-1190.
  3. de Clippel, Geoffroy & Pérez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2012. "Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 413-423.
  4. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2005. "Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games," Economics Working Papers 0050, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  5. Achille Basile & Maria Gabriella Graziano & Maria Laura Pesce, 2012. "On Fairness of Equilibria in Economies with Differential Information," CSEF Working Papers 303, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  6. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2010. "Copmment on Egalitarianism under Incomplete Information," Working Papers 2010-4, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  7. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2004. "Equity, Envy and Efficiency under Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 2004-19, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  8. Achille Basile & Maria Graziano & Marialaura Pesce, 2014. "On fairness of equilibria in economies with differential information," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 76(4), pages 573-599, April.
  9. Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano, 2008. "Information transmission and core convergence in quasilinear economies," Working Papers 2008-01, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.

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