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Equity, Envy and Efficiency under Asymmetric Information

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  • Geoffroy de Clippel

Abstract

Varian's (Varian, H., 1974. Equity, Envy and Efficiency. Journal of Economic Theory 9, 63-91) main results are not valid anymore if the agents are asymmetrically informed at the time of contracting: 1) envy-freeness and efficiency may be incompatible; 2) there may exist efficient allocation rules such that every agent envies another. Two weaker positive properties are formulated.
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Suggested Citation

  • Geoffroy de Clippel, 2004. "Equity, Envy and Efficiency under Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 2004-19, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2004-19
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Robert Wilson, 2005. "Information, efficiency, and the core of an economy," Studies in Economic Theory, in: Dionysius Glycopantis & Nicholas C. Yannelis (ed.), Differential Information Economies, pages 55-64, Springer.
    2. Thomas R. Palfrey & Sanjay Srivastava, 1987. "On Bayesian Implementable Allocations," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 54(2), pages 193-208.
    3. de Clippel, Geoffroy, 2007. "The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 144-158, July.
    4. Varian, Hal R., 1974. "Equity, envy, and efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 63-91, September.
    5. Elisha A. Pazner & David Schmeidler, 1974. "A Difficulty in the Concept of Fairness," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 41(3), pages 441-443.
    6. Thibault Gajdos & Jean-Marc Tallon, 2002. "Fairness under Uncertainty," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(18), pages 1-7.
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    Cited by:

    1. Achille Basile & Maria Graziano & Marialaura Pesce, 2014. "On fairness of equilibria in economies with differential information," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 76(4), pages 573-599, April.
    2. de Clippel, Geoffroy & Pérez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2012. "Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 413-423.
    3. Chiara Donnini & Maria Laura Pesce, 2018. "Strict Fairness of Equilibria in Mixed and Asymmetric Information Economies," CSEF Working Papers 498, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    4. Chiara Donnini & Marialaura Pesce, 2020. "Strict fairness of equilibria in asymmetric information economies and mixed markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(1), pages 107-124, February.
    5. Chiara Donnini & Maria Graziano & Marialaura Pesce, 2014. "Coalitional fairness in interim differential information economies," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 111(1), pages 55-68, February.
    6. Maria Laura Pesce, 2011. "Are Asymmetrically Informed Agents Envious?," CSEF Working Papers 292, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    7. Marialaura Pesce, 2017. "Are Asymmetrically Informed Individuals Irremediably Envious?," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(1), pages 2-21, February.

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