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Re-Reforming the Bostonian System: A Novel Approach to the Schooling Problem

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  • Alcalde, Jose
  • Romero-Medina, Antonio

Abstract

This paper proposes the notion of E-stability to conciliate Pareto efficiency and fairness. We propose the use of a centralized procedure, the Exchanging Places Mechanism. It endows students a position according with the Gale and Shapley students optimal stable matching as tentative allocation and allows the student to trade their positions. We show that the final allocation is E-stable, i.e. efficient, fair and immune to any justifiable objection that students can formulate.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 28206.

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Date of creation: 18 Jan 2011
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:28206

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Keywords: School allocation problem; Pareto efficient matching;

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References

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  1. Alcalde, Jose, 1996. "Implementation of Stable Solutions to Marriage Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 240-254, April.
  2. José Alcalde Pérez & Antonio Romero-Medina, 2011. "Fair School Placement," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) 2011-22, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  3. Varian, Hal R., 1974. "Equity, envy, and efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 63-91, September.
  4. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun S�nmez, 2005. "The Boston Public School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 368-371, May.
  5. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sönmez, 2003. "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 729-747, June.
  6. Ehlers, Lars & Erdil, Aytek, 2010. "Efficient assignment respecting priorities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 145(3), pages 1269-1282, May.
  7. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2009. "Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of Discrete Resources," Boston College Working Papers in Economics, Boston College Department of Economics 717, Boston College Department of Economics.
  8. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Molis, Elena, 2011. "Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: The Top Trading Absorbing Sets mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 1-16, September.
  9. Alcalde, J. & Barberà, S., 1992. "Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy-Proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 196.92, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  10. Roth, Alvin E., 1982. "Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 127-132.
  11. Haluk I. Ergin, 2002. "Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2489-2497, November.
  12. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Yeon-Koo Che & Yosuke Yasuda, 2011. "Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The "Boston Mechanism" Reconsidered," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 101(1), pages 399-410, February.
  13. Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Pathak, Parag Abishek & Roth, Alvin E., 2009. "Strategy-Proofness Versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match," Scholarly Articles 11077572, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  14. José Alcalde, 1994. "Exchange-proofness or divorce-proofness? Stability in one-sided matching markets," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 275-287, December.
  15. Haluk Ergin & Tayfun Sönmez, 2005. "Games of School Choice under the Boston Mechanism," Boston College Working Papers in Economics, Boston College Department of Economics 619, Boston College Department of Economics.
  16. Aytek Erdil & Haluk Ergin, 2008. "What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 669-89, June.
  17. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sonmez, 2006. "Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism," NBER Working Papers 11965, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Martinez, Ruth & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro & Oviedo, Jorge, 2000. "Single Agents and the Set of Many-to-One Stable Matchings," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 91-105, March.
  19. Balinski, Michel & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 73-94, January.
  20. Alvin E. Roth & Uriel G. Rothblum, 1999. "Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets--In Search of Advice for Participants," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 67(1), pages 21-44, January.
  21. Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
  22. Onur Kesten, 2010. "School Choice with Consent," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 125(3), pages 1297-1348, August.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. YuenLeng Chow & Isa Hafalir & Abdullah Yavas, . "Auctions versus Negotiated Sale: Evidence from Real Estate Sales," GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business 2012-E22, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  2. José Alcalde Pérez & Antonio Romero-Medina, 2011. "Fair School Placement," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) 2011-22, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  3. José Alcalde Pérez & Begoña Subiza Martínez, 2012. "On integration policies and schooling," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) 2012-06, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  4. Alcalde, Jose & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 2011. "On Stability and Efficiency in School Choice Problems," MPRA Paper 28831, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Alcalde, José & Subiza, Begoña, 2012. "Affirmative Action and School Choice," QM&ET Working Papers, Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica 12-3, Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica.
  6. EHLERS, Lars & HAFALIR, Isa E. & YENMEZ, M. Bumin & YILDIRIM, Muhammed A., 2011. "School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds versus Soft Bounds," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques 2011-08, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  7. Alcalde, Jose & Silva-Reus, José Ángel, 2013. "Allocating via Priorities," QM&ET Working Papers, Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica 13-3, Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica.

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