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On Integration Policies and Schooling

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  • Alcalde, Jose
  • Subiza, Begoña

Abstract

This paper proposes a reform for school allocation procedures in order to help integration policies reach their objective. For this purpose, we suggest the use of a natural two-step mechanism. The (stable) first step is introduced as an adaptation of the deferred-acceptance algorithm designed by Gale and Shapley (1962), when students are divided into two groups. The (efficient) second step captures the idea of exchanging places inherent to Gale's Top Trading Cycle. This latter step could be useful for Municipal School Boards when implementing some integration policies.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 29145.

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Date of creation: 24 Feb 2011
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:29145

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Keywords: Integration Policy; School Allocation; Affirmative Action;

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  1. Roth, Alvin E & Xing, Xiaolin, 1994. "Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 992-1044, September.
  2. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2005. "The New York City High School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 364-367, May.
  3. Alcalde, José & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 2011. "Fair School Placement," QM&ET Working Papers, Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica 11-1, Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica.
  4. EHLERS, Lars, 2010. "School Choice with Control," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques 2010-05, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  5. Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
  6. Ergin, Haluk & Sonmez, Tayfun, 2006. "Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 215-237, January.
  7. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sönmez, 2003. "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 729-747, June.
  8. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sonmez, 2006. "Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc 11965, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Thomas J. Kane & Stephanie K. Riegg & Douglas O. Staiger, 2006. "School Quality, Neighborhoods, and Housing Prices," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(2), pages 183-212.
  10. Sönmez, Tayfun & Pathak, Parag A. & Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Roth, Alvin, 2005. "The Boston Public School Match," Scholarly Articles, Harvard University Department of Economics 2562764, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  11. Elliott Peranson & Alvin E. Roth, 1999. "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 748-780, September.
  12. ALCALDE-UNZU, Jorge & MOLIS, Elena, 2009. "Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the Top Trading Absorbing Sets mechanisms," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 2009062, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  13. Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Pathak, Parag Abishek & Roth, Alvin E., 2009. "Strategy-Proofness Versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match," Scholarly Articles, Harvard University Department of Economics 11077572, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  14. Frankel, David M. & Volij, Oscar, 2010. "Measuring School Segregation," Staff General Research Papers, Iowa State University, Department of Economics 31808, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  15. Onur Kesten, 2010. "School Choice with Consent," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 125(3), pages 1297-1348, August.
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