Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

What Have We Learned from Market Design?

Contents:

Author Info

  • Roth, Alvin

Abstract

This essay discusses some things we have learned about markets, in the process of designing marketplaces to fix market failures. To work well, marketplaces have to provide thickness, i.e. they need to attract a large enough proportion of the potential participants in the market; they have to overcome the congestion that thickness can bring, by making it possible to consider enough alternative transactions to arrive at good ones; and they need to make it safe and sufficiently simple to participate in the market, as opposed to transacting outside of the market, or having to engage in costly and risky strategic behavior. I'll draw on recent examples of market design ranging from labor markets for doctors and new economists, to kidney exchange, and school choice in New York City and Boston.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/2579650/Roth_market%20design.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Harvard University Department of Economics in its series Scholarly Articles with number 2579650.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in The Economic Journal: The Quarterly Journal of The Royal Economic Society
Handle: RePEc:hrv:faseco:2579650

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Littauer Center, Cambridge, MA 02138
Phone: 617-495-2144
Fax: 617-495-7730
Web page: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Milgrom,Paul, 2004. "Putting Auction Theory to Work," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521551847.
  2. Roth, Alvin E, 1991. "A Natural Experiment in the Organization of Entry-Level Labor Markets: Regional Markets for New Physicians and Surgeons in the United Kingdom," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 415-40, June.
  3. Sönmez, Tayfun & Pathak, Parag A. & Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Roth, Alvin, 2005. "The Boston Public School Match," Scholarly Articles, Harvard University Department of Economics 2562764, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  4. Alvin E Roth & Muriel Niederle, 2007. "Making Markets Thick: Designing Rules for Offers and Acceptances," Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics 843644000000000142, UCLA Department of Economics.
  5. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, December.
  6. Elliott Peranson & Alvin E. Roth, 1999. "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 748-780, September.
  7. Muriel Niederle, 2006. "Competitive Wages in a Match with Ordered Contracts," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc 12334, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Roth, Alvin & Niederle, Muriel, 2005. "The Gastroenterology Fellowship Market: Should There Be A Match?," Scholarly Articles, Harvard University Department of Economics 2562766, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  9. Roth, Alvin & Ünver, M. Utku & Sönmez, Tayfun, 2005. "A Kidney Exchange Clearinghouse in New England," Scholarly Articles, Harvard University Department of Economics 2562810, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  10. Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth, 2007. "The Effects of a Centralized Clearinghouse on Job Placement, Wages, and Hiring Practices," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc 13529, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Alvin Roth, 2008. "Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 537-569, March.
  12. Jonathan Levin & Jeremy Bulow, 2004. "Matching and Price Competition," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings, Econometric Society 350, Econometric Society.
  13. Plott, Charles R., 1996. "Laboratory Experimental Testbeds: Application to the PCS Auction," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 957, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  14. Peter Cramton, 1997. "The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 431-495, 09.
  15. Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Pathak, Parag Abishek & Roth, Alvin E., 2009. "Strategy-Proofness Versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match," Scholarly Articles, Harvard University Department of Economics 11077572, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  16. Dan Ariely & Axel Ockenfels & Alvin E. Roth, 2005. "An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(4), pages 890-907, Winter.
  17. Roth, Alvin E., 1985. "The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 277-288, August.
  18. Ünver, M. Utku & Sönmez, Tayfun & Roth, Alvin, 2007. "Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences," Scholarly Articles, Harvard University Department of Economics 2562809, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  19. Milgrom, Paul, 1998. "Putting auction theory to work : the simultaneous ascending auction," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank 1986, The World Bank.
  20. Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2004. "Kidney Exchange," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 119(2), pages 457-488, May.
  21. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez, 2006. "Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism," Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics 122247000000001022, UCLA Department of Economics.
  22. Paul Klemperer, 2004. "Auctions: Theory and Practice," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics 2004-W09, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  23. Georgy Artemov, 2008. "Matching and price competition: would personalized prices help?," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 321-331, March.
  24. Crawford, Vincent P., 2005. "The Flexible-Salary Match: A Proposal to Increase the Salary Flexibility of the National Resident Matching Program," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, UC San Diego qt2gw114b2, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
  25. C. Nicholas McKinney & Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth, 2005. "The Collapse of a Medical Labor Clearinghouse (and Why Such Failures Are Rare)," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 878-889, June.
  26. Alvin E. Roth, 2006. "Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets," Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics 321307000000000629, UCLA Department of Economics.
  27. John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth, 2000. "The Dynamics Of Reorganization In Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated By A Natural Experiment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 115(1), pages 201-235, February.
  28. repec:rje:randje:v:37:y:2006:3:p:645-667 is not listed on IDEAS
  29. Roth, Alvin E., 1982. "Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 127-132.
  30. Ulrich Kamecke, 1993. "Wage Formation in a Centralized Matching Market," Discussion Paper Serie A, University of Bonn, Germany 422, University of Bonn, Germany.
  31. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Smez, 2003. "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics 0203-18, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  32. Sonmez, Tayfun, 1997. "Manipulation via Capacities in Two-Sided Matching Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 197-204, November.
  33. Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2004. "Pairwise Kidney Exchange," Boston College Working Papers in Economics, Boston College Department of Economics 620, Boston College Department of Economics.
  34. Gary S. Becker & Julio Jorge El�as, 2007. "Introducing Incentives in the Market for Live and Cadaveric Organ Donations," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 21(3), pages 3-24, Summer.
  35. John Cawley, 2001. "A Guide (and Advice) for Economists on the U. S. Junior Academic Job Market," Labor and Demography, EconWPA 0109001, EconWPA, revised 27 Sep 2001.
  36. Alvin E. Roth, 2002. "The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1341-1378, July.
  37. Li, Hao & Rosen, Sherwin, 1998. "Unraveling in Matching Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 371-87, June.
  38. Guillaume R. Fréchette & Alvin E. Roth & M. Utku Ünver, 2007. "Unraveling yields inefficient matchings: evidence from post-season college football bowls," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(4), pages 967-982, December.
  39. Roth,Alvin E. & Sotomayor,Marilda A. Oliveira, 1992. "Two-Sided Matching," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521437882.
  40. Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "House Allocation with Existing Tenants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 233-260, October.
  41. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Yeon-Koo Che & Yosuke Yasuda, 2008. "Expanding "Choice" in School Choice," Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics 0809-09, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  42. Peter Cramton & Yoav Shoham & Richard Steinberg, 2004. "Combinatorial Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton 04mit, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2004.
  43. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2005. "The New York City High School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 364-367, May.
  44. Posner, Richard A. & Avery, Christopher & Jolls, Christine & Roth, Alvin, 2001. "The Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks," Scholarly Articles, Harvard University Department of Economics 2623748, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  45. Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth, 2003. "Unraveling Reduces Mobility in a Labor Market: Gastroenterology with and without a Centralized Match," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(6), pages 1342-1352, December.
  46. Robert Wilson, 2002. "Architecture of Power Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1299-1340, July.
  47. Roth, Alvin E & Xing, Xiaolin, 1994. "Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 992-1044, September.
  48. Bruno Biais & Pierre Hillion & Chester Spatt, 1999. "Price Discovery and Learning during the Preopening Period in the Paris Bourse," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(6), pages 1218-1248, December.
  49. Roth, Alvin E, 1991. "Game Theory as a Part of Empirical Economics," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(404), pages 107-14, January.
  50. Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sonmez, 2008. "Leveling the Playing Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1636-52, September.
  51. David S. Evans & Andrei Hagiu & Richard Schmalensee, 2008. "Invisible Engines: How Software Platforms Drive Innovation and Transform Industries," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262550687, December.
  52. Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
  53. Alvin E Roth & Richard A Posner & Christine Jolls & Christopher Avery, 2007. "The New Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks," Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics 843644000000000288, UCLA Department of Economics.
  54. Ergin, Haluk & Sonmez, Tayfun, 2006. "Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 215-237, January.
  55. Fuhito Kojima & Parag A. Pathak, 2009. "Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 608-27, June.
  56. Alvin E. Roth & Axel Ockenfels, . "Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet," Papers on Strategic Interaction, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group 2002-32, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  57. Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 991-1016, December.
  58. Roth, Alvin E & Xing, Xiaolin, 1997. "Turnaround Time and Bottlenecks in Market Clearing: Decentralized Matching in the Market for Clinical Psychologists," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 284-329, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. Al Roth
    by Liam Delaney in Geary Behaviour Centre on 2010-07-26 11:06:00
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hrv:faseco:2579650. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ben Steinberg).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.