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Games of School Choice under the Boston Mechanism

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Author Info
Haluk Ergin (MIT)
Tayfun Sönmez () (Boston College)

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Abstract

Many school districts in the U.S. use a student assignment mechanism that we refer to as the Boston mechanism. Under this mechanism a student loses his priority at a school unless his parents rank it as their first choice. Therefore parents are given incentives to rank high on their list the schools where the student has a good chance of getting in. We characterize the Nash equilibria of the induced preference revelation game. An important policy implication of our result is that a transition from the Boston mechanism to the student-optimal stable mechanism would lead to unambiguous efficiency gains.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Boston College Department of Economics in its series Boston College Working Papers in Economics with number 619.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 12 Sep 2005
Date of revision:
Publication status: forthcoming, Journal of Public Economics
Handle: RePEc:boc:bocoec:619

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Related research
Keywords: student assignment; Boston mechanism; induced preference revelation; mechanism design;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Hideo Konishi & M. Utku Unver, 2001. "Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospital-Intern Markets," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 515, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 31 Jul 2002. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Marilda Sotomayor, 2003. "Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 241-251, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2005. "The New York City High School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 364-367, May. [Downloadable!]
  4. Shinotsuka, Tomoichi & Takamiya, Koji, 2003. "The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: implementation in Nash equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 379-389, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Shin, Sungwhee & Suh, Sang-Chul, 1996. "A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 185-189, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Roth, Alvin E., 1985. "The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 277-288, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Alcalde, Jose, 1996. "Implementation of Stable Solutions to Marriage Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 240-254, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sonmez, 2005. "The Boston Public School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 368-371, May. [Downloadable!]
  9. Kara, Tarik & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1996. "Nash Implementation of Matching Rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 425-439, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Tayfun Sönmez & Tarik Kara, 1997. "Implementation of college admission rules (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 197-218.
  11. Tadenuma, Koichi & Toda, Manabu, 1998. "Implementable stable solutions to pure matching problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 121-132, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Roth, Alvin E., 1984. "Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 383-387, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2002. "Efficient Priority Rules," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 554.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 991-1016, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Alcalde, Jose & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 2000. "Simple Mechanisms to Implement the Core of College Admissions Problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 294-302, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Haluk I. Ergin, 2002. "Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2489-2497, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Alvin E. Roth, 2002. "The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1341-1378, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Balinski, Michel & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 73-94, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Alvin E. Roth & Elliott Peranson, 1999. "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 748-780, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Sebastian Braun & Nadja Dwenger & Dorothea Kübler, 2007. "Telling the Truth May Not Pay Off: An Empirical Study of Centralised University Admissions in Germany," IZA Discussion Papers 3261, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Guillaume Haeringer & Flip Klijn, 2006. "Constrained School Choice," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 671.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), revised 02 Dec 2008. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez, 2006. "Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 639, Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Joana Pais & Agnes Pinter & Robert F. Veszteg, 2008. "College admissions and the role of information : an experimental study," Economics Working Papers we080302, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Yeon-Koo Che & Yosuke Yasuda, 2008. "Expanding "Choice" in School Choice," Discussion Papers 0809-09, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sonmez, 2005. "The Boston Public School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 368-371, May. [Downloadable!]
  7. Sebastian Braun & Nadja Dwenger & Dorothea Kübler, 2007. "Telling the Truth May Not Pay Off," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 759, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  8. Alvin Roth, 2008. "Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 537-569, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Fuhito Kojima, 2008. "Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 357-365, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-23.

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