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An analysis of the German university admissions system

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  • Alexander Westkamp

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    Abstract

    This paper analyzes the sequential admissions procedure for medical subjects at public universities in Germany. Complete information equilibrium outcomes are shown to be characterized by a stability condition that is adapted to the institutional constraints of the German system. I introduce matching problems with complex constraints and the notion of procedural stability. Two simple assumptions guarantee existence of a student optimal procedurally stable matching mechanism that is strategyproof for students. In the context of the German admissions problem, this mechanism weakly Pareto dominates all equilibrium outcomes of the currently employed procedure. Applications to school choice with affirmative action are also discussed. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-012-0704-4
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

    Volume (Year): 53 (2013)
    Issue (Month): 3 (August)
    Pages: 561-589

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:53:y:2013:i:3:p:561-589

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    Related research

    Keywords: University admissions; Matching; Stability; Strategyproofness; Complex constraints; C78; D02;

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    References

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    1. Claus-Jochen Haake & Bettina Klaus, 2009. "Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 393-410, December.
    2. Roth, Alvin E., 1985. "The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 277-288, August.
    3. Yenmez, M. Bumin & Yildirim, Muhammed Ali & Hafalir, Isa Emin, 2013. "Effective affirmative action in school choice," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(2), May.
    4. Alvin E Roth, 2007. "Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000283, UCLA Department of Economics.
    5. Guillen, Pablo & Kesten, Onur, 2010. "Matching Markets with Mixed Ownership: The Case for A Real-life Assignment Mechanism," Working Papers 2010-01, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
    6. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Yeon-Koo Che & Yosuke Yasuda, 2010. "Expanding “Choice” in School Choice," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000062, David K. Levine.
    7. Braun, Sebastian & Dwenger, Nadja & Kübler, Dorothea, 2007. "Telling the Truth May Not Pay Off: An Empirical Study of Centralised University Admissions in Germany," IZA Discussion Papers 3261, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    8. Joana Pais, 2008. "Random matching in the college admissions problem," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 99-116, April.
    9. Lars Ehlers & Isa Hafalir & Bumin Yenmez & Muhammed Yildirim, 2011. "School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds versus Soft Bounds," GSIA Working Papers 2012-E20, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    10. Marek Pycia & M. Utku Ünver, 2009. "Incentive Compatible Allocation and Exchange of Discrete Resources," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 715, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 11 Mar 2014.
    11. Balinski, Michel & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 73-94, January.
    12. Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 47-57, January.
    13. Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 991-1016, December.
    14. Kelso, Alexander S, Jr & Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1483-1504, November.
    15. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez, 2006. "Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001022, UCLA Department of Economics.
    16. Clayton Featherstone & Muriel Niederle, 2008. "Ex Ante Efficiency in School Choice Mechanisms: An Experimental Investigation," NBER Working Papers 14618, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Yeon-Koo Che & Yosuke Yasuda, 2011. "Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The "Boston Mechanism" Reconsidered," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(1), pages 399-410, February.
    18. Hatfield, John William & Kojima, Fuhito, 2009. "Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 745-749, November.
    19. John William Hatfield & Fuhito Kojima, 2008. "Matching with Contracts: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 1189-94, June.
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    Cited by:
    1. Dwenger, Nadja & Kübler, Dorothea & Weizsäcker, Georg, 2014. "Flipping a coin: Theory and evidence," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2013-201r, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
    2. Franz Diebold & Haris Aziz & Martin Bichler & Florian Matthes & Alexander Schneider, 2014. "Course Allocation via Stable Matching," Business & Information Systems Engineering, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 97-110, April.

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