A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 51 (1996)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Alcalde, Jose, 1996.
"Implementation of Stable Solutions to Marriage Problems,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
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- Moulin, H. & Peleg, B., 1982. "Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 115-145, June.
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"Constrained School Choice,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
671.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), revised 02 Dec 2008.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2006:i:20:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
- Takamiya, Koji, 2009. "Preference revelation games and strong cores of allocation problems with indivisibilities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1-2), pages 199-204, January.
- Koji Takamiya, 2006. "Preference Revelation Games and Strong Cores of Allocation Problems with Indivisibilities," ISER Discussion Paper 0651, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Haluk Ergin & Tayfun Sönmez, 2005.
"Games of School Choice under the Boston Mechanism,"
Boston College Working Papers in Economics
619, Boston College Department of Economics.
- José Alcalde & Pablo Revilla, 1998.
"- The Role Of Unions In Hiring Procedures For Job Markets,"
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- Alcalde, Jose & Revilla, Pablo, 1999. "The role of unions in hiring procedures for job markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 189-195, February.
- Matthew O. Jackson, 2001.
"A crash course in implementation theory,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
- Yuji Fujinaka & Toyotaka Sakai, 2009. "The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 325-348, November.
- Sang-Chul Suh & Quan Wen, 2008. "Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 163-174, June.
- Hideo Konishi & Chiu Yu Ko, 2009.
Boston College Working Papers in Economics
721, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 23 Apr 2012.
- Sonmez, Tayfun, 1997. "Games of Manipulation in Marriage Problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 169-176, August.
- EHLERS, Lars & MASSÓ, Jordi, 2007.
"Matching Markets under (In)complete Information,"
Cahiers de recherche
2007-01, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
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- Koji Takamiya, 2006. "On the Equivalence of G-weak and -strong Cores in the Marriage Problem," ISER Discussion Paper 0652, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jul 2006.
- Ehlers, Lars, 2004. "Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(2), pages 358-369, February.
- Ozkal-Sanver, Ipek & Remzi Sanver, M., 2005. "Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 304-317, November.
- Koji Takamiya, 2006. "On the equivalence of G-weak and -strong cores in the marriage problem," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(20), pages 1-8.
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