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A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems

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Author Info
Shin, Sungwhee
Suh, Sang-Chul
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 51 (1996)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 185-189
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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:51:y:1996:i:2:p:185-189

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  1. Sang-Chul Suh & Quan Wen, 2008. "Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 163-174, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Yuji Fujinaka & Toyotaka Sakai, 2009. "The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 325-348, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. repec:ese:iserwp: is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Koji Takamiya, 2006. "Preference Revelation Games and Strong Cores of Allocation Problems with Indivisibilities," ISER Discussion Paper 0651, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. [Downloadable!]
  5. Haluk Ergin & Tayfun Sönmez, 2005. "Games of School Choice under the Boston Mechanism," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 619, Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Koji Takamiya, 2006. "On the Equivalence of G-weak and -strong Cores in the Marriage Problem," ISER Discussion Paper 0652, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jul 2006. [Downloadable!]
  7. Guillaume Haeringer & Flip Klijn, 2006. "Constrained School Choice," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 671.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), revised 02 Dec 2008. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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