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Efficient Priority Rules

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  • Lars Ehlers
  • Bettina Klaus

Abstract

We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (universities, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and reallocation-consistency. Such a rule respects an acyclic priority structure and the allocations are determined using the deferred acceptance algorithm.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Barcelona Graduate School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 103.

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Date of creation: Jan 2003
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Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:103

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Keywords: Acyclic priority structures; indivisible objects;

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References

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  1. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2007. "Consistent House Allocation," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 561-574, March.
  2. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2003. "Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation," Working Papers 33, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  3. Ehlers, Lars, 2002. "Coalitional Strategy-Proof House Allocation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 298-317, August.
  4. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2003. "Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 566.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  5. Lars-Gunnar Svensson, 1999. "Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 557-567.
  6. Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "House Allocation with Existing Tenants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 233-260, October.
  7. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sönmez, 2003. "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 729-747, June.
  8. Szilvia Papai, 2000. "Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(6), pages 1403-1434, November.
  9. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve, 2001. "A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 295-328, October.
  10. Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina & Papai, Szilvia, 2002. "Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 329-339, November.
  11. Balinski, Michel & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 73-94, January.
  12. Ergin, Haluk I., 2000. "Consistency in house allocation problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 77-97, August.
  13. Haluk I. Ergin, 2002. "Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2489-2497, November.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Haluk Ergin & Tayfun Sönmez, 2005. "Games of School Choice under the Boston Mechanism," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 619, Boston College Department of Economics.
  2. Alvin E Roth, 2007. "Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000283, UCLA Department of Economics.
  3. Haeringer, Guillaume & Klijn, Flip, 2009. "Constrained school choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 1921-1947, September.
  4. Onur Kesten & Ayşe Yazıcı, 2012. "The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 50(2), pages 463-488, June.
  5. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2004. "Fair and Efficient Student Placement with Couples," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 616.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), revised 01 Mar 2006.
  6. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2004. "Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 32(4), pages 545-560, 08.
  7. Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip, 2013. "Local and global consistency properties for student placement," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 222-229.
  8. EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina, 2009. "Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities," Cahiers de recherche 17-2009, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  9. Fuhito Kojima & M. Ünver, 2014. "The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 55(3), pages 515-544, April.
  10. William Thomson, 2011. "Consistency and its converse: an introduction," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 257-291, December.

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